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Abstract
ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMICS OF AGING
by
Zhendong Zhao
Adviser: Professor David A. Jaeger
The increase in life expectancy in the US and the changing labor supply of older workers
have raised issues about the fiscal solvency of health care and pension systems, as well
as labor market stability and employment opportunities for younger workers. In light of
these facts, this dissertation consists of three essays that focus on the economic causes and
consequences of changes in the labor supply of older workers due to population aging.
The first essay examines the effect of longevity on older Americans’ labor supply de-
cisions of retirement and un-retirement. Instead of using self-rated survival probabilities
as the proxy of longevity expectations, I use data from the Health and Retirement Study
to predict longevity from a Gompertz survival model with a rich set of variables including
parental mortality information, current health and socio-economic variables. I find that the
predicted longevity fits actual longevity better than subjective survival rates. Using pre-
dicted longevity as one of the independent variables in a sequential logit model of retiring
and un-retiring, I find that individuals retire and re-enter the labor market as if they knew
their true potential longevity, i.e., individuals with higher predicted objective longevity retire
later, and are more likely to return to the labor market after initial retirement. I further
investigate the consequences of extreme mismatch between subjective survival rates and ob-
jective longevity implied by the model’s prediction, and I find that the misperception leads
to retirees’ suboptimal saving behaviors.
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The second essay makes an effort to explore the theoretical foundation for the mechanism
through which the risk of mortality affects individuals’ decisions about work. I construct a
life-cycle model of labor supply with health investment and heterogeneous risk of mortality.
The heterogeneity in mortality risk is modeled as a frailty parameter which shifts the mor-
tality hazard proportionally. Individuals can invest in health in order to recover from an
adverse health shock and revert the high propensity of death which they were born with. I
estimate and calibrate the model using data from Health and Retirement Survey. I simulate
the life cycle path of labor supply for two groups of representative individuals under the
same condition except for different survival curves, one in year 2000 and one projected in
2100 where life expectancy is predicted to be increased by 9 years. I find that in a more
favorable survival environment, individuals would choose to work more and spend more on
health.
The third essay examines a natural follow-up question about the consequence of a larger
labor supply of older workers: does the higher labor force participation rate of the el-
derly crowd out employment opportunities of younger workers? I utilize the Social Security
“Notch,” a reduction in Social Security benefits for cohorts born after 1916 due to the 1977
Amendments, as an exogenous policy change to identify the effect on younger workers’ em-
ployment. Using data from Current Population Survey from 1972 to 1981, I do not find
any significant crowding-out effect of the notch generation on younger workers age 25-39. I
further investigate the variations in different occupational categories and find that changes
in employment rates of younger workers vary across occupations. Last, I do not find signifi-
cant suppressing effect of increasing labor supply of older workers on younger workers’ wage
income.
v
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Chapter 1
The Effect of Longevity on
Retirement and Un-retirement
1.1 Introduction
The expectation of remaining lifespan plays a key role in the sequential decisions of when
to retire, and whether to re-enter the labor market after full-time retirement. Sufficient
and efficient provisions for retirement could save an individual from outliving his or her
retirement wealth, or not consuming enough and leaving an unnecessarily large amount of
wealth at death. An efficient retirement plan therefore requires a precise prediction of one’s
own longevity.
According to human capital theory, life expectancy should affect all life-cycle decisions.
Higher life expectancy increases the value of long-term investment such as human capital
accumulation and investment in health (Grossman, 1972) and consequently affects life-time
savings and retirement plans. Continual improvement in medical technology leads to in-
creased expected longevity, conditional on having reached an older age relative to expected
longevity at younger ages. This increasing life expectancy at older ages could alter the
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retirement plans of older workers through at least two mechanisms. First, workers must
work more to finance their longer retirement lives. Second, longer life spans could mean
that workers are more likely to return to work because of social isolation during retirement.
Numerous studies have found a beneficial effect of moderate levels of work at older ages on
health and subsequent mortality (Snyder and Evans, 2006; Coe and Zamarro, 2011). For
many people, working is very likely to be the primary form of social activity that keeps
them staying physically active and mentally sharp. Retiring from work cuts off retirees’
social network, which has been found to have adverse health impact on the elderly (Cornwell
and Waite, 2009; Steptoe et al., 2013). Therefore, a utility maximizing individual may seek
employment at older ages, either by staying at their current job longer or switching to a
new job. Furthermore, dissatisfaction with retirement may induce frequent reentry to the
labor market among retirees (Beck, 1985; Hardy, 1991). Whether there are multiple spells
of retirement and re-employment or there is a gradual withdrawal from the labor market,
retirement may now be less of an absorbing state because of longer lifespan.
The primary measure used to explore the relationship between retirement and expected
longevity in the current literature is a self-reported survival rate (Hurd, Smith, and Zissi-
mopoulos, 2004; Bloom et al., 2006; Delavande, Perry, and Willis, 2006; Khan, Rutledge,
and Wu, 2014). I will discuss in detail in the next section, however, that compared to either
actual population life table or the subsequent mortality, self-reported survival rates have
very little correlation with actual longevity. On the other hand, it is not appropriate to use
actual longevity for the following two reasons. First, most survey time spans are not long
enough to fully observe actual longevity for all survey respondents, i.e., most observations for
longevity are right-censored. Second, actual longevity is endogenous to retirement decisions,
i.e., there are unobserved factors that affect both longevity and retirement decisions, such as
intelligence and attitudes towards risk. Using actual longevity, even when it is fully observed
without right censoring, will lead to biased estimates.
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This study circumvents such difficulties by predicting longevity from a survival model
with parental mortality information, individuals’ risky health behaviors, and other charac-
teristics that are correlated with life-expectancy but likely to be uncorrelated with retire-
ment decisions. This predicted objective longevity fits actual longevity better than subjec-
tive survival rates. Using predicted longevity in a sequential retirement and un-retirement
model, I find that individuals’ labor supply decisions are in accordance to their true poten-
tial longevity, although they have poor perceptions of their own future survival probabilities.
That is, individuals with longer objective longevity retire later and are more likely to return
labor market after initial retirement.
To the best of my knowledge, there is only one paper (Shang and Goldman, 2008) that
uses a similar estimation strategy to predict remaining lifetime from a survival model, which
is then used to estimate the effect of increasing longevity on medical expenditures. They
argue that “given demographic characteristics and health status, how long an individual is
going to live has a probability distribution. Life expectancy is the mean of the distributions
and time-until-death would be the realization of a draw from the distribution.” I adopt a
similar strategy and provide new evidence from an objective view of longevity on sequential
labor supply transitions of older workers in the US using the Health and Retirement Study.
This paper is one of the first to examine the effect of longevity on retirees’ reentry to the
labor market after retirement. I further inspect the consequences of extreme misperceiving
longevity on retiree’s saving behaviors and find that individuals with misperception of their
future survivals are not efficiently saving for their retirement.
1.2 Literature and Subjective vs. Objective Longevity
The theoretical foundation of the link between mortality and retirement was first explored
using dynamic programming models. Rust’s (1989) dynamic programming model for retire-
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ment incorporates the risk of mortality. Rust and Phelan (1997) extend this model and
predict that people with self-reported poor health have higher mortality risks and are more
likely to apply for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) or claim Social Security retire-
ment benefits early, but they only model the mortality as a function of self-reported health
and marital status. Ben´ıtez-Silva et al. (2006) simulate a three-period life cycle model with
various mortality risks and find an increase in risk of mortality at the retirement period from
the baseline 20% to 25% would result in 58.2% of people claiming Social Security early.
Most of the life-cycle predictions support the argument that people with higher remaining
life expectancy tend to retire later, except one recent study by Kalemli-Ozcan and Weil
(2010). They simulate a simple optimization problem where individuals choose their optimal
retirement age under idiosyncratic mortality shocks, and find that in an environment with
extremely high mortality risk, people choose to work until death due to uncertainty in
mortality expectations. Once mortality risk decreases, people start to have the chance to
plan and enjoy retirement. They attribute the early retirement trend to the large decline
in mortality risk in the past century. It is misleading, however, to draw the conclusion that
lower mortality risk will induce earlier retirement from their findings. The primary difference
of their finding from other life-cycle model evidence is that Kalemli-Ozcan and Weil’s (2010)
model is a simple optimization simulation with only two choice variables, rather than a
life-cycle model that accounts for many other choice variables such as investment in health,
extensive and intensive margins of labor force participation, etc. The time span in their
model is longer than the life-cycle of a pseudo agent. I think within a life cycle framework,
a positive effect of longevity on retirement still holds.
Empirically, Eggleston and Fuchs (2012) calculate the expected labor force participation
rates that are attributable to increased life expectancies in the US: after controlling for age-
specific labor force participation rates, increases in life expectancy have increased expected
lifetime working years from 25.7 to 38.7 years for men and from 22.7 to 33.3 years for women
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in the past century. They conclude that longer life expectancy, especially gained in later
life (as opposed to decreased child mortality), would significantly delay retirement. It might
be one of the major explanations of the increase of labor force participation of older men
since 1990s. Hurd, Smith, and Zissimopoulos (2004) present evidence from micro-level data
that a self-reported zero probability of living to age 85 or older leads to early retirement and
early claiming of Social Security. The variable they use as a proxy for expected longevity
is the subjective survival rate in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). They assert that
subjective survival probabilities (measured as the probability of living to age 85 or older)
are not correlated with current health, age, and social-economic variables. I think, however,
that subjective survival probability are potentially correlated with social-economics status,
health, and other unobserved factors, and such correlations will induce biased estimates of
the true effect of life expectancy on retirement decisions.
There are several reasons why subjective survival probabilities might be correlated with
unobserved factors that determine retirement. First, there are too many missing values and
inconsistent reports across waves. Non-response on the survival probability question may be
correlated with current health. For example, those who are currently not in good health and
expect not to live longer would be more likely skip these survival questions Ben´ıtez-Silva
and Ni (2008). There are also measurement errors in these variables due to the fact that
the question asks about a concept that cannot be physically confirmed when a respondent is
alive. In other words, it is hard for the respondents who are aged from 50s to 60s to answer
the questions of the probabilities of living additional 25 to 35 years. These measurement
errors might also be correlated with education, cognitive ability, occupation, current wealth,
and social isolation (Kaplan and Camacho, 1983).
The large focal points of subjective survival rates are one of the signs of measurement
error. Figure 1.1 plots men’s responses of the self-assessed probabilities of living to age 75
and age 85 or older for the core respondents in Health and Retirement Study (HRS) who
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were aged from 51 to 61 in the 1992 wave. It is hard to believe that such a large proportion
of people would report zero probability of living to age 75, given that the life expectancy
of an American man was 73 in 1992.1 The responses are concentrated on round-numbered
percentage points, indicating errors in a theoretically continuous variable. It would cause
attenuation bias when using this variable in a regression under the assumption of a classical
measurement error. Biasedness would increase if the measurement errors are endogenous
and correlated with the outcome variable. Another warning sign is the contradicting reports
between probabilities of living to age 75 and probabilities of living to age 85. For instance,
there are people who report lower probabilities of living to age 75, but at the same time report
higher probabilities of living to age 85 in the same interview. Table 1.3 shows the number
of such misreporting in the first 4 waves of the HRS.2 One can see that as respondents get
older, they are more likely to skip probability questions in later waves, which might indicate
that the measurement error is correlated with cognitive ability and age.
Recognizing the endogeneity of subjective survival probabilities, some subsequent studies
have tried to correct for measurement error by instrumenting subjective survival probabilities
with parents’ mortality information (Bloom et al., 2006; Delavande, Perry, and Willis, 2006).
But this does not address the fundamental issue that the original variable they intend to
instrument, the subjective survival rate, is an indirect and systematically biased proxy of
underlying potential longevity in the first place, such that people tend to be overly-pessimistic
about living to age 75 but over-optimistic about living to age 85 or older (Elder, 2013; Hurd
and McGarry, 2002). The instrumental variable approach might not help to correct for such
an imperfect and non-monotone correlation between subjective survival rates and potential
1This figure is from United Nations Statistical Division, Population and Vital Statistics Report.
2The question of probabilities of living beyond age 85 was stopped asking since 5th interview wave. CODA
respondents are not young enough to be asked about probabilities of living to age 75. The question wording
changed to self-assessment of probabilities of living additional 10 years for respondents who were older than
65. To be consistent and comparable, I only plot the first 4 waves when both Pr(85+) and Pr(75+) questions
were asked, and when all HRS cohorts were young enough to respond these probability questions.
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longevity in the first stage IV regression.3
Figure 1.2 shows comparisons of weighted subjective survival rates of male HRS re-
spondents and the corresponding age-specific survival rates from 1992 Life Table of the US
population. It is obvious that self-reported survival rates are systematically biased from the
objective ones in actual Life Table. Consistent to the finding by Elder (2013), I also find
that HRS respondents are more likely to be overly-optimistic about living beyond age 85 but
relatively pessimistic about living beyond age 75 at early 60s. Realizing the biasedness in
subjective survival rates and limitations of the classical IV approach to correct measurement
errors, I abandon this variable completely and adopt a survival model with shared frailty to
predict potential life expectancy at current age. Using this predicted life expectancy in place
of subjective survival rates in retirement equation, I can consistently estimate the effect of
longevity on retirement decisions.
1.3 Estimation Strategy
I predict the objective life expectancy from a proportional Gompertz hazard model with
a rich set of health and socio-economic variables. The median survival time from the sur-
vival model is the objective potential longevity. There are several advantages of using a
survival model. First, it naturally incorporates the nature of the aging process, reflecting
increased deterioration in health a person faces at older ages. I assume that the baseline
population survival curve is similar for everyone after controlling for family background,
education, health and socioeconomic status. Based on this underlying survival curve, I can
predict everyone’s life expectancy according to their specific characteristics. Information
such as parental mortality and educational levels, which capture the genetic components of
3The poor correlation between subjective survivals rates and actual age of death are plotted in Figure
1.11.
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mortality hazard, individuals’ own education levels, current health and wealth status, res-
idential regions, marital status and risky behaviors are included in the survival model for
longevity prediction. Second, the relevant life expectancy for retirement decisions is the one
near retirement age, not the one at birth. The predicted potential longevity based on ones’
current characteristics at each interview year will be able to reflect the individual’s potential
remaining life time his/her current health could project, which is directly relevant to indi-
viduals’ retirement plans. In other words, the process of predicting individuals’ longevity
from a survival model of the researcher is an advanced analog to the individual’s expectation
formation process. Last and more importantly, the contribution of the survival model is
to predict the potential longevity for individuals who are alive, since the majority of the
respondents are still alive in the latest 2010 interview. Inserting the predicted longevity into
the second-stage retirement equation, the effect of longevity on retirement can be estimated
consistently.
The covariates in the survival model to predict the objective longevity are indicators of
whether the parents died before age 50, parents’ years of education, whether one survives
beyond the parents’ age of death, residential census regions, educational attainment, ethnic-
ity, and some time varying characteristics including whether currently smoking or not, body
mass index (BMI) and its square, health conditions such as being diagnosed with cancer,
diabetes, lung diseases, heart diseases, and whether the individual recently had a stroke,
total household assets, labor force status, and marital status. 4
In order to account for the heterogeneous hazard of mortality among individuals, I incor-
porate an individual frailty component. The frailty is assumed to follow an inverse-Gaussian
distribution with unit mean and a finite variance, which will be estimated from the data. For
4The major reason for choosing a low age threshold for parental mortality is to avoid right censoring of
parental survival age. The youngest respondents in the analysis sample were aged 51 in 1992. Thus the
threshold of age 50 excludes the case that includes young and alive parents in the category of early parental
death. A low age threshold also includes extreme cases of early parental death. Furthermore, life expectancy
for the parent’s cohorts are relatively smaller as well.
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an individual who has a frailty value that is greater than one, he experiences an increased
hazard of mortality through his life for reasons left unexplained by the covariates in the
survival model. A similar conclusion can be drawn for individuals who have smaller frailty
values. The frailty model was first introduced by Vaupel, Manton, and Stallard. (1979)
for mortality studies. In the literature, the distribution of frailty is usually assumed to be
either Gamma or inverse Gaussian. In general, with the passage of time, the effect of co-
variates on the population hazard will diminish while the frailty effect will become more of
an important factor in determining mortality hazard. The implications of these two distri-
butional assumptions are different. Hougaard (1984) discusses that the gamma frailty holds
the relative variability of the frailties among survivors constant, while the relative variability
for the inverse Gaussian distribution will decrease over time, making the survivors more
homogeneous.
1.3.1 First-stage Survival Model
The Gompertz proportional hazard model is widely used in medical and biological research
to model mortality. The Gompertz model fits the aging process well for individuals who are
younger than 80. 5 To be more specific, the instantaneous hazard function for a person with
a set of covariates Xis has the following functional form:
h(ti, Xis|αi) = αie(Xisβ+γti) (1.1)
where Xis includes all the covariates discussed above which are observed at the episode of
(t0i, ti]. Some of the Xis are time-varying and some of them are not. The time-varying vari-
ables update an individual’s longevity expectations contemporaneously. The γ is a shape
5Thatcher, Kannisto, and Vaupel (1998) has discussed the alternative models of mortality for the elderly
age between 80 to 120.
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parameter determining the monotonicity of the hazard function. αi is the frailty term cap-
turing person-specific heterogeneity, i.e. unobserved factors such as interactions of genetics
and personal life-style, environment, attitudes towards risk, etc. In this model, I assume
that the frailty follows an inverse-Gaussian distribution with a mean of 1 and a variance of
θ. Its density function is:
g(α) = (
1
2piθα3
)1/2exp(−(α− 1)
2
2αθ
) (1.2)
The frailty is a multiplicative term that shifts the hazard function proportionally. Indi-
viduals who possess small values of frailty, for instance αi < 1, are less prone to death and
thus tend to survive longer, ceteris paribus. In contrast, those who have αi > 1 are frailer
to mortality. The conditional survival function S(ti, Xis|αi) is:
S(ti, Xis|αi) = S(ti, Xis)αi = [e(1−
1
γ
e(Xisβ)+γti)]αi (1.3)
The median survival time, which will be used as predicted longevity in the second stage, is
the τi that makes the individual survival curve equal to 0.5.
With the survival function in (3), we can derive the log-likelihood function. Suppose
the individual i is observed over the entire risk-exposure period (T0, Ti], which contains ni
numbers of small episodes. In an episode of (t0is, tis], the death occurred at time tis is denoted
by dis = 1; while dis = 0 means that failure time (mortality) is right-censored at this time
interval. Therefore, the conditional log-likelihood function for the individual i is:
lnLi(αi) = ln
ni∏
s=1
S(ti,Xis|αi)(1−dis)f(tis,Xis|αi)dis
S(t0i,Xis|αi)
=
ni∑
s=1
[lnS(ti, Xis|αi)− lnS(t0i, Xis|αi) + dish(tis, Xis|αi)]
(1.4)
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The overall log-likelihood function for the entire sample is the summation of unconditional
log-likelihood functions, which can be obtained by integrating out the frailty with its density
function:
lnL =
n∑
i=1
[ln
ˆ ∞
0
Li(αi)g(αi)dαi] (1.5)
1.3.2 Second-stage Sequential Logit Model of Retirement and Reen-
try
The definition of retirement is different across studies in the literature. Some define self-
reported partial or full retirement as retirement, which consider part-time working at older
ages also as retirement. Other studies define retirement as the transition from a paid em-
ployment to a complete withdrawal from labor market, and take that as an absorbing status,
ignoring the dynamic labor supply decisions after the initial retirement. In fact, retirees are
always able to and most likely to return to work after a period of full-time retirement. For
example, retirees may switch to a part-time job or work in self-employment with more flex-
ible schedules. Such phenomena, along with a gradual withdrawal from labor market before
full-time retirement, are less uncommon now than in the past. Another problem of using
the first observed retirement from a paid work as absorbing state is that it suffers from left
censoring for the observation of first retirement time.
There are several reasons for reentry to the labor market after an initial retirement. First,
with working environments that are friendlier to older workers due to the passage of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act in 1967 and the elimination of mandatory retirement in
most sectors since 1986, older workers who expect to live longer and whose health allows
them to continuing working face fewer restrictions in seeking employment. Second, due to
dissatisfaction with retired life and unfulfilled career goals, retirement may be perceived to be
11
an opportunity to start a new career. Figure 1.3 shows that, compared to retirees who never
re-entered labor market, reentrants tend to report more dissatisfaction during retirement.
Third, as discussed in Section 1.1, retirees may also experience beneficial health effect from
engaging in moderate working. Another important reason is associated with reduced income
stream and loss of employer-provided health insurance coverage. Last, the elimination of the
Social Security Earnings Test for retirees older than the full retirement age (FRA) in 2000
removes restrictions on reentries for older Social Security beneficiaries. Furthermore, early
claimers, i.e., those who claimed Social Security retirement benefits before FRA, are able to
revert early-claiming penalty through the earnings test if their earnings are above certain
threshold Ben´ıtez-Silva and Heiland (2008). At the same time, since 2000, the FRA has
been gradually raised from age 65 to age 67 based on year of birth. That imposes a larger
penalty rate on lifetime benefit levels for the earliest claimers and subsequently induces
greater financial incentives to staying employed before FRA. As a result, many studies have
documented that retirees have actively re-entered the labor market after full-time retirement
(Hardy, 1991; Maestas, 2010; Kail and Warner, 2013). Therefore, I use a sequential logit
model to fit such labor supply transitions.
In the literature, O’Rand and Henretta (1982) are among the first to model retirement
behavior using a sequential logit framework. They set up a tree of retirement decisions: the
first transition is whether to retire before age 62; given not retired before 62, the second
transition is whether to retire before age 64 or later. Different from a nested logit or a
multinomial logit model, which do not distinguish the time order of potential alternatives, a
sequential logit model fits the sequential nature of retirement and un-retirement transitions
better. Furthermore, a binary dependent variable model with a non-absorbing retirement
status assumes a symmetric effect of longevity on transitions from work to retirement and
from retirement to work. The sequential logit model is capable of testing whether these
effects are asymmetric. Cameron and Heckman (1998) have pointed out the bias as a result
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of ignoring unobserved heterogeneity in a sequential logit model, namely, the selection bias
from passing each transition and the inconsistency due to the nonlinear functional form
of the selection equation. I therefore follow the framework proposed by Buis (2011) and
incorporate a normally distributed individual heterogeneity term to capture the unobserved
factors such as time preference, risk aversion and preference towards working.
Figure 1.4 shows the decision-making tree that a potential retiree faces, where y1 and y2
are the binary dependent variables at each transition stage. Going back to work from full-
time retirement (y2 = 1) is an alternative that is only available after the initial retirement
(y1 = 1). The key contribution of this framework is to differentiate working before initial
retirement (y1 = 0) and working after retirement (y2 = 1).
Retirement is defined by self-reported completely retired, which means the individual is
no longer actively looking for employment or working in any form.6 On the other hand,
going back to work is defined as a transition from full-time retirement to working, including
any types of employment. Since the reasons of re-entering labor market are similar to
the ones for the onset of retirement, I use similar sets of covariates for both transition
processes. The common covariates includes demographic characteristics such as age and age
squared, ethnicity, education, marital status, self-reported health, health insurance types
and coverage, pension types, and total household assets. Since the FRA for Social Security
claiming varies with year of birth for cohorts born after 1938, which greatly affects the amount
of benefits and time of retirement, I also include a set of dummy variables for year of birth to
control for the changes in Social Security rules. In addition, since the initial age of retirement
might be associated with the probabilities of re-entering the labor market, the effect of
longevity might be different for early retirees relative to elder retirees. Therefore, I include
6Unemployment are not considered as retirement. Instead, it is considered as active in labor market
in this study. Because self-reported unemployed status implies availability for and interest in working, as
opposed to self-reported retired. For example, a full-time retiree can report being unemployed after some
periods of retirement, which signals the intention of seeking employment which has not been realized.
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the age of initial retirement and an interaction term of predicted longevity and retirement age
in the second transition. Given the uncertainty of mortality and the difficulty in self-accessing
remaining life time, I include the age-specific standard deviations of predicted longevity and
subjective survival rates to capture the risk associated with longevity expectations. They
provide the information similar to confidence intervals that are observable to individuals
when they are assessing their future survival rates comparing to their same-age peers. 7
Given the mean, the larger the standard deviations are, the harder for individuals to precisely
forecast the risk of mortality. Last, subjective survival rates may contain some information
that are correlated with retirement and mortality but unobserved to the researcher, I also
include the predicted values for self-reported probabilities of living beyond age 85 from a
linear IV model with the same set of instruments in the first-stage survival model.
The probability of passing each transition is essentially a logit model for the individuals
at risk. Suppose that in the first transition, the probability of keeping working is pw, thus the
probability of retiring will be (1 − pw). Once the individual passes the first transition, i.e.,
given that he/she has retired, the conditional probability of going back to work is pbw, and
probability of staying retired is (1− pbw). With the presence of an individual heterogeneity
component ui, which is assumed to follow a standard normal distribution, the probabilities
of retiring and reentry in the next wave are, respectively:
(1− pw,it+1) = Pr(y1,it+1 = 1|Xit, ui) = Λ(Xitβw + ui) (1.6)
pbw,it+1 = Pr(y2,it+1 = 1|Xit, ui, y1,it = 1) = Λ(Xitβb + ui) (1.7)
where y1 and y2 are indicators of each transition; Xit is a set of explanatory variables; Λ
7Myers and Manton (1984) and Rothenberg, Lentzner, and Parker (1991) are among the first studies
using standard deviations to measure the inequality in life expectancy.
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denotes the logistic function. Notice that I use the current status in covariates to predict
the probabilities of retiring and un-retiring in the next wave. From equation (1.6) and (1.7)
we can easily find the probability of keep working before initial retirement, and probability
of retiring after going back to work. The the individual’s likelihood function should be:
Li(ui) =
T∏
t=1
Pr(y1,it, y2,it|ui) (1.8)
The log-likelihood function for the entire sample therefore will be:
lnL =
N∑
i=1
ln
ˆ
Li(ui)f(ui)dui (1.9)
where the f(ui) is the density of individual heterogeneity, which I assume is a standard nor-
mal distribution. The method of simulated maximum likelihood (Train, 2009) is employed.
The process is: 1). randomly draw a u from its distribution; 2). calculate the probabilities
by taking the drawn value of u as the true value; 3). repeat the random draws of u and then
approximate the integral, which is essentially a mean, by its sample analog.8
1.4 Data
I use 10 waves of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) from 1992 to 2010. I restrict
the sample to the original HRS respondents and the cohort of children of the depression
(CODA), who were not institutionalized (in nursing home or in jail) when interviewed. The
original HRS respondents are those who participated in the 1992 interview and were born
between 1931 to 1941. The CODA cohorts were first interviewed in 1998 and were born
between 1924 to 1930. I follow them from the baseline interview until the latest 2010 wave.
The number of remaining respondents and number of deaths occurring in each wave are
8This procedure with more efficient pseudo-random draws from a Halton sequence can be implemented
in Stata with the seqlogit package proposed by Buis (2010).
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documented in Table 1.4. Since the CODA cohorts are older, they contribute more death
cases to the analysis sample and consequently are the main driver of the identification for
the survival model.
In total, I have 9,815 respondents from HRS cohorts in 1992 and 3,747 respondents from
CODA cohorts in 1998. Among them, in total 4,255 respondents have died during the
survey period, which means the surviving respondents have right-censored observations for
their actual longevity. The summary statistics for HRS and CODA cohorts at the baseline
wave are presented in Table 1.1 in the Appendix. The Kaplan-Meier Survival estimate of
my analysis sample is plotted in Figure 1.5. The formula for Kaplan-Meier estimator is:
S(ti) =
∏
ti≤t
(1− di
ni
) (1.10)
where the analysis time is age. S(ti) is the cumulative survival probability in time period
ti, di is the number of individuals who died during time period ti, and ni is the number of
individuals who are at risk at the beginning of ti. Given the number of individuals who died
at different ages in the sample, we can see that survival rates starts to fall from the late 50s
because both HRS and CODA cohorts begin to die out around that age. The cumulative
probability of living beyond age 80 is about 50%.
Figure 1.6 plots the distribution of self-reported initial retirement age for all retirees in
my analysis sample.9 Since in the sequential model of retirement and un-retirement, I only
analyze individuals who are working at the baseline interview in order to avoid left-censoring
issues, I dropped those who already retired at or before baseline interview. There are two
peaks of retiring at age 62 and 65, which correspond to the early retirement age (ERA)
and full retirement age (FRA), respectively, for claiming Social Security. This may support
the argument of joint decisions of retirement and Social Security claiming (Ben´ıtez-Silva and
9Values smaller than age 50 constitutes less than 4% of all respondents in HRS and CODA cohorts who
were working at baseline interview. Thus they are ignored in Figure 1.6.
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Heiland, 2008). Since in public-use HRS data the exact dates of benefit take-up and the types
of benefits are not available, imputed time of claiming Social Security retirement benefits is
very inaccurate. I therefore do not present results on for the joint model of retirement and
claiming Social Security in this study. 10
Figure 1.7 documents the proportions of retirees who go back to work in the next interview
wave out of total retirees at each wave. The blue bars are the retirees who stayed retired in
the next wave, and the dark red bars are the retirees who returned to labor market in the
next wave. The numbers above each bar are the proportion of reentrants. Since labor market
activities in 2012 are not available in 2010 interview, the number of next-wave reentrants is
unknown in 2010. We can see that, in early waves when respondents were relatively young
and working was more possible, reentry rates were more than 20% for both genders at early
waves. The reentry rates are relatively smaller for women. The corresponding table for
Figure 1.7 are in Appendix Table 1.2. The reentry rates in this study are similar with what
Maestas (2010) has documented under the narrow definition of retirement (do not consider
partial-retirement as retirement). The reentry rates of this study are slightly smaller due to
the inclusion of CODA cohorts who are much older than the original HRS cohorts and are
less likely to be active in labor market.
The data do not have the exact dates of reentry, I will not be able to analyze multi-spell
employment hazards quantitatively. I can, however, use self-reported labor force participa-
tion status and the respondents’ current age at interview to approximate the age of reentry
and provide a general image of reentry hazard for the analysis sample. Figure 1.8 plots both
10I estimated a bivariate probit model of joint decisions of retirement and Social Security claiming, the
output of which is available upon request. Due to the inaccurate imputation of Social Security take-up ages
and benefit types from public-use data, I do not find a significant effect of longevity on Social Security claiming
for both genders. Another reason of insignificance could be that the variations in Social Security claiming
ages are relatively smaller than retirement ages because of an age cap of delaying Social Security take-up
(age 70 of Delayed Retirement Credit). Thus, it limits the role of expected longevity in realized claiming
behaviors regardless the intention an individual has to delay. In the rest of this paper, I estimate retirement
equation only without considering mutual causality between retirement and Social Security claiming.
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the Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard and periodic hazard contribution of reentry against du-
ration of the initial retirement. The periodic hazard is the highest during first two years of
retirement, and significantly decreases after eight years. These preliminary findings coincides
with Maestas (2010). The cumulative hazard of reentry is about 50% after fourteen years of
retirement. The step shape of hazard function is due to the biannual nature of the survey
and the implied assumption of a constant hazard between successive interviews. That means
I could have ignored some transitory employment spells in between adjacent interviews, thus
underestimating the frequency and hazard of reentry for the retirees in Figure 1.8.
1.5 Estimation Results
Since men and women experience different aging processes and therefore have different pat-
terns of labor force attachment as they age, I estimate all models separately for men and
women. Due to the fact that I use predicted values from the first stage as one of the in-
dependent variables in the second stage, standard errors would be incorrect if I ignore the
non-randomness of the predicted values as an independent variable. I bootstrap the two
stages together (200 replications) and calculate the reported bootstrapped standard errors;
they are reported for both stages outputs (Tables 1.5 to 1.7). The bootstrap procedure is
the following: resample at the individual level to get the bootstrap replicate sample, run
the first-stage survival model and predict longevity for all individuals; include the predicted
longevity in second-stage equation and keep the estimates for both stages; repeat the previ-
ous two steps 200 times; and calculate the bootstrapped standard errors from the empirical
distribution of all replicated estimates.
18
1.5.1 First-stage: Gompertz Survival Model
The Gompertz hazard model is structured with multi-episode records for each individual.
Longevity is therefore predicted at each wave, updating with new information about changes
in health, wealth and other mortality-related characteristics. Predicted longevity based on
the sample’s population survival curve and individual’s characteristics can be taken as the
objective counterpart of individual’s potential longevity. Prediction of longevity is condi-
tional on individual frailty equal to the mean of its distribution, which is one. The results of
estimating the Gompertz survival model are shown in Table 1.5. All coefficients in the first
stage can be interpreted as the log of odds ratios. Although many coefficients are statisti-
cally insignificant, this is likely due to multicollinearity. As long as there is a high correlation
between predicted and actual longevity, the intermediate results from this first stage are not
as important in this study.
In the first-stage survival model, I find an insignificant same-gender parental link to
mortality as opposed to the findings in the current literature: the coefficients of early parental
mortality and the additional indicators of whether an individual has lived longer than the
parents’ ages at death are insignificant. The parental link of mortality is still inconclusive
in the current literature. Some studies found no correlation between parental death and the
children’s longevity, while others found significant same-gender parental link (Po¨rtner and
Wong, 2013; Goldberg, Larson, and Levy, 1996). The effect is confounded with parents’
education, family income, quality of parenting, and nutrition intake of the mother during
pregnancy. Due to such correlation, I do not find significant effect of the parents’ education
neither. Although many studies have found positive impact of the parents’ education on
infant mortality (Cleland and van Ginneken, 1988; Caldwell, 1979; Das Gupta, 1990), such
long-run effect on child survival at older ages are rarely studied. One of the potential
channels is that improved household income and better parenting during childhood from
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well-educated parents have a positive effect on children’s achievements in adulthood, and
consequently reduce their mortality. In accordance to other studies’ findings that both
being underweight and being overweight would induce many adverse health consequences
(Neovius, Kark, and Rasmussen, 2008; Campbell and Gerich, 1990), I also find a significant
non-linear effect of BMI on mortality. The insignificance of currently smoking might be due
to the correlation between smoking and onset of lung disease, which also increases the risk of
mortality for both genders. Residential regions are included in the regression because many
studies have found evidence of geographic variations of mortality and cancer diagnosis across
regions in the US (Krieger et al., 2002; Garland et al., 1990; Fenelon, 2013; Hastert et al.,
2014). I however do not find such significant differences for my sample, possibly because the
regional variables that I controlled for are broad census regions and may offset the variations
at smaller regional levels. Other health and socio-economic variables contribute significantly
to subsequent mortality and my findings are in line with the related literature. For example,
better education has been long argued to be associated with higher lifetime earnings and
better comprehension of health-related information, and therefore could promote greater life
expectancy (Lleras-Muney, 2005; Lager and Torssander, 2012; Kippersluis, O’Donnell, and
Doorslaer, 2011). Adverse health conditions such as cancer, strokes, diabetes, lung disease or
heart disease are all directly associated with subsequent death (Jagger and Clarke, 1988; Idler
and Angel, 1990; Ho, 1991; McGee et al., 1999). Compared to never married, marriage does
have a protective effect on older couples (Gove, 1973; Lillard and Panis, 1996). On the other
hand, a divorce has a larger adverse health impact on women (Sbarra and Nietert, 2009).
Being inactive in labor market are strongly correlated with higher risks of mortality for men
but not for women. This finding contradicts the argument by Snyder and Evans (2006)
that moderate work promotes better health for the elderly. The causal effect of working
on subsequent mortality is however inclusive in the literature. It confounds with types of
occupations, stress levels, and hours of work, and there is a potential reversed causality. In
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my analysis, I do not distinguish types of occupations and employment status.
A positive estimate of the shape parameter γ indicates that the mortality hazard is
monotonically increasing with time. But given that one has survived to an older age, he/she
would face a significantly lower hazard of surviving additional two years, which explains the
negative coefficient of age. The Likelihood-Ratio test of no individual-specific heterogeneity
(the null of which is variance of the frailty θ is zero) is strongly rejected at 1% level, indicating
that there is still part of the mortality hazard that is left unexplained by observed covariates.
In order to show that predicted longevity is a good fit of the mortality process for my
analysis sample, I plot the kernel density of age at death for all the dead respondents against
their predicted longevity at the wave before their death in Figure 1.9. We can see that the
predicted longevity generally overlaps the actual age of death very closely, with some slight
deviations around the mean. The predictive power of my survival model is satisfying. In
addition to comparing the kernel density of predicted longevity against age of death, I also
provide the scatter plot in Figure 1.10. The data points of predicted longevity cluster closely
around the actual longevity on the 45 degree line (solid red line in Figure 1.9). In general, the
prediction residuals are very small across all ages at death. A simple OLS regression of actual
longevity on predicted longevity (denoted as the red dashed line) is almost indistinguishable
from the 45 degree line. Both the significant OLS slope coefficient and high R2 indicate an
excellent prediction of the survival model.
In contrast to the high predictive power of the Gompertz survival model, the self-reported
probabilities of surviving beyond age 75 and 85 are not good predictors for actual longevity at
all. The scatter plots of actual longevity against subjective survival rates at the wave before
death are shown in Figure 1.11. The coefficients from simple regressions of actual longevity
on self-reported survival rates are insignificant at all conventional levels. In addition, the
conditional variance of actual longevity at any clustered values of subjective survival rates are
very large, which further confirms the fact that individuals have poor prospects of their future
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survivals. Given this finding, it is possible that individuals make incorrect life-cycle decisions
about savings and expenditures and subsequently time of retirement. This will be discussed
in Section 1.5.3, where I take a closer look at saving behaviors for those individuals whose
subjective survival rates are substantially different from their objective predicted longevity.
It is difficult for individuals to predict their actual longevity because, in general, mortal-
ity is an unexpected event, e.g. deaths resulting from a heart attack or other unanticipated
accidents. With such randomness in mortality, the values of the covariates at the last inter-
view before death are presumably different from those at the moment of death. Given this
limitation of information and the lack of data on cause of death, predictions of potential
longevity can hardly be a perfect match for the actual realized mortality. Another reason
could be that the predicted longevity is calculated from average median survival time with
the frailty evaluated at the mean: α = 1 for all individuals.
1.5.2 Second-stage: Sequential Retirement and Un-retirement Model
The results for sequential logit model of retirement and un-retirement are tabulated in Table
1.6. The first and third columns correspond to the first transition: working versus retirement;
the second and fourth columns correspond to the second transition: remaining retired versus
re-entering labor market. All of the coefficients can be interpreted as log odds ratios.
Table 1.6 and 1.7 show three sets of sequential logit regressions for men and women,
respectively. Model (1) shows the result that only include subjective survival rates.11Model
(2) to model (3) compare results with or without subjective survival rates. We can see
that predicted objective longevity has a significant effect on retirement and reentry for both
genders: individuals with higher predicted objective longevity have a lower probability of
retiring in the next two years. On the other hand, longer longevity significantly leads to
11Before 1998, I use probability of living beyond age 85. After 1998 probability of living an additional 10
years for individuals who are older than 65 is used.
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a greater likelihood of re-entering the labor market after retirement. Whether to include
subjective survival rates in the regression does not affect the estimate of predicted objective
longevity much. The coefficient of predicted longevity is interpreted as log odds ratios.
For example, in Table 1.6 model (3), a man’s probability of retirement decreases by 30.1%
with one additional year of objective longevity. If he has retired, with one more year of
lifespan, he has 16.9% greater chance to reenter the labor market in two years, ceteris
paribus. Furthermore, the effect of longevity on retirement and un-retirement transitions
are significantly different: the coefficients of predicted longevity in the first transition is
twice as large as the one in the second transition. Moreover, comparing model (1) and
model (3), subjective survival rates also play a role in explaining initial retirement and
subsequent reentries. This finding suggests that individuals’ biased assessment of their own
future survivals affect their actual labor supply decisions just like true potential longevity.
Women seem more sensitive than men regarding the labor market attachment to changes
in objective longevity. Given the greater life expectancy and the substantial dispersion in
remaining life span than men, female workers might end up working at older ages. Especially
widowed women are more active in labor market, which may be due to the financial shock
from the death of the husbands. I do not find evidence supports that younger retirees are
more likely to return to work than an older retiree. In fact, signs of coefficients in front of
age of initial retirement and its interaction with predicted longevity suggest the opposite.
Some other characteristics affect retirement and un-retirement significant as well. Having
a college degree or higher educational attainment delays men’s initial retirement significantly,
even though there is a positive relationship between education and life-time income. Clearly,
health insurance coverage after retirement are important for retirees. In general, being
covered by any types of health insurance contributes to higher chance of retirement. If the
employer-provided health insurance do not cover retirement, workers would stay employed
in order to be continuously protected against adverse health shocks before they are eligible
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for Medicare. Once becoming eligible for Medicaid at age 65, older workers will be no longer
restricted by the coverage of employer-sponsored health insurance. Female workers who are
covered by their husbands’ health insurance shows less incentive to stay working. With
relatively low replacement rates of Social Security benefits, private pensions are the major
source of retirement income. Among different pension types, having a defined contribution
(DC) pension significantly delay the time of initial retirement due to fact that DC pension
holders relatively have less retirement wealth compared to defined benefit (DB) holders. The
current literature has found evidence that workers with DC tend to have higher retirement
ages than workers with DB or both DB and DC (Friedberg and Webb, 2005). Marital status
has little impact on men’s labor force participation but has greater impacts on divorced and
widowed female workers. Self-reported poor health increase the probability of retirement
and staying retired for both genders. We cannot exclude the “justification hypothesis” when
interpreting any self-reported health status, however; that is, early retirees tend to report
worse health conditions than what objective measures would suggest in order to justify their
retirement behaviors (Myers, 1982; Bazzoli, 1985).
In sum, the sequential logit model offers evidence that retirement and un-retirement are
influenced by both objective longevity and subjective survival beliefs. Although individuals
do not have precise perspectives of their true remaining life span, their labor force partici-
pation activities are in accordance to the objective longevity.
1.5.3 Saving Behaviors for the Overly-optimistic and Overly-pessimistic
Retirees
As discussed in the previous sections, the majority of HRS respondents do not have accurate
predictions about their future survivals, either by comparing subjective survival rates to
actual life table (Figure 1.2) or to their observed longevity (Figure 1.11). In general, over-
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optimism is quite common when individuals evaluate their survival probabilities to a very old
age as shown in Figure 1,2. Given the findings in the previous section that subjective survival
probabilities have no significant impact on individuals’ retirement and reentry decisions, it
is still of importance to examine how, and to what extent, the mismatch between subjective
survival rates and objective predicted longevity could mislead their saving behaviors after re-
tirement. Therefore, from the individuals who were working in the baseline wave and retired
before or at 2010, I identify two groups of individuals, namely, the overly-pessimistic and
the overly-optimistic. The overly-pessimistic people are these whose average self-reported
probabilities of living beyond age 75 or 85 across all responding interviews are less than 50%
but their average predicted objective longevity are greater than 75 or 85, respectively. In
contrast, the overly-optimistic are those who have greater than 50% of subjective probabili-
ties of living beyond 75 or 85 but with average predicted objective longevities less than these
ages.12 I would expect that overly-pessimistic individuals would draw down on their assets
faster and would be more likely to return to work after retirement than the overly-optimistic,
who would expect to accumulate assets, or at least consume assets at a slower rate.
The characteristics of the two groups at the baseline interview are tabulated in Table
8. The third column lists p-values of mean-difference tests with non-identical variance for
all variables between the two groups. A small p-value indicates a significant difference at
the means. Not surprisingly, the overly-pessimistic individuals are generally sicker, less ed-
ucated, older but with greater predicted longevity, more likely to be covered by Medicare.
More interestingly, they retire later and are more likely to be married. Consistent with the
findings in Section 1.2 that overly-optimistic about surviving to older ages is more common
than overly-pessimistic in the population, there are much fewer overly-pessimistic individuals
among all the retirees. For a simple quantitative analysis, I compare their asset accumu-
12For individuals who were too old to be asked the probability of living to 75 or 85, the information from
self-reported probabilities of living for an additional 10 years is used to identify the overly-optimistic and
overly-pessimistic people.
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lations/reductions after initial retirement with a fixed effect model. Given the longitudinal
nature of the data and potential unobserved confounding factors affecting assets accumula-
tion and individuals’ earning capacity simultaneously, a fixed-effects model would serve the
purpose of investigating within individual variations of total household assets. I control for
changes in marital status in case of asset splits or inheritance due to a divorce or the death
of a spouse, respectively, as well as adverse health events, and a set of year fixed effects to
control for year-specific effects on evaluations of assets such as business cycles. Specifically,
the fixed effect model is to fit:
Ait = αi + β1time+ β2time
2 + β3Maritalit +
2010∑
t=1994
γt + δHit + εit (1.11)
where αi is individual fixed effects; time measures the years since initial retirement, which
starts with the value of one from the time of initial retirement; γj are a set of year fixed effects;
Hit is a set of time varying health status; and Ait is a set of dependent variables, such as total
net household assets, including primary and secondary houses and self-reported changes in
total household assets. The coefficient of interest are β1and β2, whose sign captures changes
in total household assets over time for the regression of the level variable, and the rate of
change for the regression of self-reported changes in assets. The regression results are shown
in Table 1.9.
From Table 1.9, we can see that the overly-pessimistic individuals are reducing assets
rapidly after the initial retirement, holding everything else constant. The equation of self-
reported changes in assets suggests an even worse situation that the speed of assets decu-
mulation is increasing. In contrast, the overly-optimistic retirees are accumulating assets,
although at a low speed. This suggests that over-pessimism leaves retirees without enough
assets to consume after retirement. Eventually, it might force them to return labor market
at very old ages. On the other hand, over-optimism induces under-consumptions and over-
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savings. This finding confirms the fact that how an extremely false assessment of future
survival probability can lead to substantially suboptimal saving and consumption behaviors,
and consequently affect a retiree’s welfare. Given the prevalence of mismatch between sub-
jective and objective longevity in the population, this ought to raise concerns for the policy
makers.
1.6 Conclusion and Discussion
In this essay, I examine the effect of longevity on older workers’ retirement and un-retirement
transitions through a two-stage model. The first stage predicts objective longevity for re-
spondents in Health and Retirement Study from a Gompertz survival model with individual
frailty. The second stage is a sequential logit model for retirement and un-retirement transi-
tions. I find empirical evidence that people with longer life expectancy retire later, regardless
of their subjective survival beliefs. Furthermore, individuals with longer longevity are more
willing to go back to work after retirement. I find that extreme mismatch between sub-
jective and objective longevity does affect retirees’ savings, such that the overly-optimistic
individuals over-save after retirement, while overly-pessimistic individuals reduce their assets
fast. Last, consistent with the findings of Elder (2013), I also find that subjective survival
rates have poor power in predicting subsequent mortality. It might be due to the substantial
noise in these variables. As suggested by Elder (2013), two-thirds of the excess variations in
subjective survival rates are due to the response noise and guessing of survival probabilities.
These noises can be caused by individuals’ inaccurate understanding of probability concept,
and the flaws of survey questions (for example, inconsistent question wording regarding fu-
ture survival probabilities across waves). Researchers using subjective survival expectations
should be cautious about the biasedness and endogeneity of these variables.
On the other hand, the purpose of this essay is not to dispute the value of subjective
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survival probabilities. Subjective survival expectation is supposed to contain useful infor-
mation such as hidden health problems and life style that is correlated with future actual
longevity and subsequent working ability. The statistical significance of both objective pre-
dicted longevity and subjective probabilities on male workers’ retirement and un-retirement
supports this argument.
Given the finding that over-optimism about surviving to very old ages is more common
in the population, it could be one of the explanations for “retirement-consumption puzzle”,
which is the phenomenon that we observe a decrease in consumption, including non-durable
goods, after retirement (Banks, Blundell, and Tanner, 1998; Bernheim, Skinner, and Wein-
berg, 2001). The retirement consumption puzzle contradicts the consumption-smoothing
assumption of a life-cycle model. Previous studies have explained the heterogeneous re-
tirement savings by poor planning of retirement and lack of self-control at younger ages
(Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg, 2001). These explanations are not consistent with the
forward-looking assumption for agents in a life-cycle model. Blau (2008) tries to explain
the puzzle by uncertain retirement age but the magnitude of the decrease in consumption
in his simulation is still smaller than the one in the data. Some other explanations are
unexpected shocks in health, reduced work related expenses, substitution of purchases with
home production and more efficient spending as a results of more leisure (Hurd and Rohwed-
der, 2013). These arguments, however, cannot explain the reduction in consumption before
retirement, which implies the intention of reducing consumption for as a part of retirement
plan. Therefore, I think the heterogeneous longevity expectations, and more importantly,
the mismatch between subjective and objective longevity can be one additional explanations
for this puzzle. That is to say, individuals are indeed forward-looking and “optimally” plan-
ning for retirement according to their wrong subjective survival expectations. The reduction
in consumption might be the consequence of the learning process of their actual length of
retirement life.
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Misperception of future survival rates would also affect Social Security benefit claiming.
Since life-time Social Security wealth entirely depends on the number of years receiving
retirement benefits, misjudging one’s remaining lifespan would induce suboptimal claiming
behaviors and results in actuarially unfair, i.e., that life-time contributions to the system are
not equal to life-time benefits received.
In summary, this paper’s main findings confirm a life-cycle model’s predictions that
longevity affects retirement and saving behaviors at older ages. With the empirical evidence
presented that the majority of individuals over-predict their future survival rates, there are
considerable consequences of such misbeliefs. Future research would be to further investigate
the causes of mismatch between objective and subjective survival rates, and the link between
heterogeneous retirement savings and longevity expectations.
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Figure 1.1: 1992 Men’s Subjective Survival Rates
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Notes: The data source of Actual Life Table is from 1992 Human Mortality Database. The actual population probability of living to age 
75 are calculated by the formula: 75-xPx= l75/lx , where x represents starting age, i.e., conditional on what age the probability of living to 
age 75 is calculated, which takes the value from 51 to age 61 to be comparable to HRS respondents.  lx is the number of people survived 
to age x in the population. Similar formula for probability of living to 85 is employed: 85-xPx= l85/lx . 
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Figure 3. Retirement satisfaction for HRS and CODA retirees at the first wave of 
retirement 
 
Note: The data includes HRS (years of birth were 1931-1941) and CODA (years of birth were 1924-1930) 
cohorts from Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The ratings of retirement satisfaction in the first wave 
of retirement are plotted for retirees who never re-entered labor market after retirement and those who re-
entered during 1992-2010. 
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Note: The data includes HRS (years of birth were 1931-1941) and CODA (years of birth
were 1924-1930) cohorts from Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The ratings of retirement
satisfaction in the first wave of retirement are plotted for retirees who never re-entered labor
market after retirement and those who re-entered during 1992-2010.
Figure 1.3: Retirement Satisfaction
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Figure 4. Retirement and Un-retirement Decision Tree 
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Figure 5. Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates for HRS and CODA cohorts 
 
 
Figure 6. Self-reported First Retirement Age 
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Figure 1.4: Retirement and Un-retirement Decisions Tree
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Figure 1.5: Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates for HRS and CODA cohorts
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Figure 1.6: Self-reported Age of Initial Retirement
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Figure 1.7: Proportion of Retirees Reentering Labor Market
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Figure 1.10: Scatter Plot of Predicted Longevity and Actual Age at Death
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics of HRS and CODA Respondents at Baseline Interview
HRS(1992) CODA(1998)
Men Women Men Women
Age 55.56 55.53 70.47 70.46
Age at death (if died) 67.32 67.92 76.67 77.86
Black 15.75% 19.14% 10.50% 10.45%
Hispanic 9.75% 10.21% 6.97% 7.03%
Married 74.75% 63.84% 70.17% 56.15%
Partnered 3.21% 1.62% 1.26% 0.93%
Divorced or Separated 9.92% 16.01% 4.91% 7.63%
Widowed 1.53% 9.81% 6.41% 25.76%
Never Married 3.35% 3.49% 2.14% 1.85%
GED 5.73% 4.45% 6.07% 3.10%
High-school grads 28.82% 35.60% 24.49% 36.08%
Some college 19.00% 18.81% 16.13% 18.64%
College above 20.55% 13.30% 20.36% 12.72%
Arthritis 28.74% 42.18% 42.39% 55.93%
BMI 27.23 27.14 26.90 26.55
Having Cancer 3.02% 7.20% 11.71% 11.56%
Having Diabetes 10.08% 10.39% 15.69% 12.67%
Having Heart Diseases 13.89% 10.59% 26.58% 18.61%
Having Lung Diseases 7.14% 8.12% 9.23% 8.01%
Had a Stroke 3.37% 2.55% 9.52% 7.62%
Self-reported Poor Health 7.64% 7.85% 9.77% 9.81%
Health Problems Limits Work 21.25% 21.87% 32.53% 32.49%
Prob. living to 75+ 62.19 65.64 n/a n/a
Prob. living to 85+ 39.30 45.74 n/a n/a
Father’s Years of Education 8.93 8.85 8.51 8.34
Mother’s Years of Education 9.33 9.07 8.99 8.73
Mother’s Age at Death (If died) 69.14 68.12 74.71 74.71
Father’s Age at Death (If died) 68.82 67.58 71.50 71.20
Covered by Employer-Provided Health Insurance 59.70% 36.76% 33.08% 17.53%
Covered by Spouse’s Health Insurance 7.16% 11.41% 4.66% 15.26%
Covered by Medicaid 2.88% 5.38% 5.64% 8.73%
Covered by Medicare 4.96% 3.65% 96.44% 97.18%
Having Defined Benefit (DB) 26.76% 18.64% 1.31% 1.39%
Having Defined Contribute (DC) 22.26% 14.85% 1.94% 1.80%
Having Both DB and DC 1.59% 0.78% 0.24% 0.42%
In Labor Force 81.78% 62.58% 26.87% 16.08%
Total Years of Working 33.67 22.43 42.95 25.15
Total Household Assets incl. 2nd House 225493.90 197968.70 363352.30 297809.10
Max N 4600 5215 1750 1997
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Table 1.2: Reentries at Each Interview Wave for Workers Working at Baseline Wave
Men Women
Interview Total Going to Reenter Percentage out Currently Going to Reenter Percentage out
Year Retired Next Wave of Current Retirees Retired Next Wave of Current Retirees
1992 0 0 0 0 0 0
1994 431 97 22.51% 327 57 17.43%
1996 745 181 24.30% 633 138 21.80%
1998 1016 204 20.08% 851 186 21.86%
2000 1328 272 20.48% 1,043 194 18.60%
2002 1630 322 19.75% 1,338 240 17.94%
2004 1775 309 17.41% 1,547 227 14.67%
2006 1908 304 15.93% 1,714 225 13.13%
2008 1874 240 12.81% 1,809 199 11.00%
2010 1881 n/a n/a 1,899 n/a n/a
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Table 1.3: Inconsistent Reports of Probabilities of Living to 75 and 85
Number of People Number of Percentage of
Misreporting Pr(75+)¡Pr(85+) Respondents Misreporting
Wave 1992 228 9126 2.50%
Wave 1994 139 7873 1.77%
Wave 1996 188 7421 2.53%
Wave 1998 116 5781 2.01%
Table 1.4: Sample Size at Each Interview Wave
Wave HRS (Born 1931-1941) CODA(Born 1924-1930)
Respondents Death Respondents Death
1992 9815 0
1994 8914 167
1996 8543 214
1998 8258 218 3747 0
2000 7796 281 3431 197
2002 7548 350 3161 253
2004 7247 255 2881 260
2006 6871 325 2625 274
2008 6560 325 2343 267
2010 6112 528 2017 341
Total 2663 1592
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Table 1.5: First Stage Gompertz Survival Model
Men Women
Mother Died Before 50 -0.251 0.473
(0.308) (0.305)
Father Died Before 50 0.0477 -0.400
(0.318) (0.339)
BMI -0.244** -0.203***
(0.105) (0.064)
BMI2 0.00344* 0.00251**
(0.0018) (0.001)
Smoking Now 0.0421 0.0735
(0.204) (0.232)
Father Education 0.00680 -0.00171
(0.0273) (0.03)
Mother Education 0.00810 -0.0224
(0.0266) (0.03)
Passed Mom’s Age at Death 0.122 -0.269
(0.214) (0.213)
Passed Dad’s Age at Death 0.124 0.322***
(0.2001) (0.172)
Northeast -0.391 -0.710
(6.538) (5.832)
Midwest -0.236 -0.666
(6.562) (5.851)
South -0.503 -0.733
(6.551) (5.828)
West -0.432 -0.647
(6.569) (5.859)
Cancer 0.590*** 0.741***
(0.188) (0.181)
Stroke 0.105 0.584**
(0.273) (0.263)
Diabetes 0.342* 0.526***
(0.187) (0.195)
Lung Diseases 0.278 0.335*
(0.233) (0.209)
Heart Diseases 0.361** 0.337*
(0.149) (0.191)
Black 0.185 0.329
(0.232) (0.255)
Hispanic 0.182 -0.0474
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Men Women
(0.297) (0.343)
Married -0.338 0.341
(0.372) (0.509)
Partnered -0.202 -0.119
(0.563) (1.016)
Separated or Divorced -0.128 0.556
(0.405) (0.527)
Widowed -0.483 0.361
(0.439) (0.515)
GED 0.109 0.119
(0.315) (0.395)
High-school Graduates -0.0423 -0.262
(0.225) (0.233)
Some College -0.222 -0.285
(0.249) (0.255)
College Above -0.0765 -0.303
(0.235) (0.327)
Non-house assets in $1000 -2.30e-05 -2.75e-06
(7.79e-05) (1.89e-04)
Not in Labor Force 0.457*** 0.404
(0.167) (0.217)
Age -3.526*** -3.701
(0.101) (0.106)
γ 3.474*** 3.676***
(0.0668) (0.0760)
θ 5.894*** 7.015***
(0.821) (1.016)
Constant 2.552 0.278
(1.401) (1.301)
Birth Year Dummy Yes Yes
Reject Insignificant Heterogeneity Yes Yes
Individuals 5387 5976
Observations 30,788 36,162
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.6: Sequential Logit Model for Retirement and Un-Retirement (Men)
(1) (2) (3)
Retire vs. Reentry vs. Retire vs. Reentry vs. Retire vs. Reentry vs.
Work Retire Work Retire Work Retire
Predicted Longevity -0.366*** 0.114*** -0.362*** 0.156***
(0.0192) (0.0312) (0.0246) (0.0369)
Subjective Pr(85+) -0.00671*** 0.00344** -0.00621*** 0.00309**
(0.00107) (0.00151) (0.00110) (0.00151)
Longevity × Initial Retirement Age 0.000223 0.00134
(0.000681) (0.00153)
Initial Retirement Age 0.0252*** -0.00460 -0.0694
(0.00873) (0.0474) (0.106)
Age 1.075*** 0.671*** 1.318*** 0.349*** 1.301*** 0.733***
(0.0760) (0.169) (0.0731) (0.129) (0.0802) (0.182)
Age2 -0.00662*** -0.00486*** -0.00592*** -0.00369*** -0.00575*** -0.00709***
(0.000576) (0.00124) (0.000552) (0.00102) (0.000606) (0.00159)
Married 0.266 0.194 0.240 -0.0222 0.360 0.150
(0.261) (0.407) (0.248) (0.319) (0.266) (0.408)
Partnered 0.437 0.273 0.516* 0.0527 0.556* 0.277
(0.323) (0.452) (0.296) (0.367) (0.332) (0.452)
Separated or Divorced 0.443 -0.0130 0.401 -0.147 0.479* -0.0348
(0.285) (0.428) (0.266) (0.339) (0.289) (0.429)
Widowed 0.522* -0.185 0.491* -0.330 0.557* -0.207
(0.311) (0.455) (0.294) (0.377) (0.314) (0.456)
Black 0.0724 0.0769 0.0764 0.106 0.0831 0.0876
(0.131) (0.165) (0.110) (0.136) (0.134) (0.165)
Hispanics -0.189 -0.110 -0.179 -0.155 -0.127 -0.135
(0.147) (0.204) (0.127) (0.168) (0.151) (0.204)
GED 0.313 0.0797 0.386** -0.0847 0.381* 0.0722
(0.196) (0.264) (0.169) (0.229) (0.200) (0.265)
High School Grads. 0.123 0.162 0.184* 0.122 0.211* 0.142
(0.118) (0.159) (0.102) (0.128) (0.120) (0.160)
Some College -0.0819 0.129 -0.0447 0.0523 -0.0334 0.112
(0.128) (0.173) (0.112) (0.142) (0.130) (0.173)
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Retire vs. Reentry vs. Retire vs. Reentry vs. Retire vs. Reentry vs.
Work Retire Work Retire Work Retire
College Above -0.462*** 0.0793 -0.351*** 0.00166 -0.356*** 0.0506
(0.129) (0.178) (0.115) (0.150) (0.132) (0.178)
Total Assets in $1000 -7.27e-05** 7.99e-06 -8.21e-05** 1.33e-05 -6.44e-05* 4.34e-06
(3.40e-05) (4.08e-05) (3.49e-05) (3.69e-05) (3.40e-05) (4.12e-05)
Covered by Medicaid 1.017*** -0.126 1.139*** 0.0852 1.041*** -0.0974
(0.191) (0.199) (0.162) (0.157) (0.195) (0.198)
Covered by Medicare 0.478*** 0.230* 0.624*** 0.309*** 0.601*** 0.146
(0.0749) (0.123) (0.0657) (0.103) (0.0768) (0.125)
Employer HI NOT Covering Retirement -0.507*** 0.141 -0.566*** 0.0359 -0.522*** 0.177
(0.125) (0.274) (0.101) (0.225) (0.131) (0.277)
Employer-Provide Health Insurance 0.279*** -0.135 0.319*** -0.210** 0.264*** -0.130
(0.0744) (0.109) (0.0659) (0.0948) (0.0761) (0.110)
Covered by Spouse’s Health Insurance 0.0178 -0.0461 0.122 -0.0552 0.0199 -0.0485
(0.117) (0.164) (0.0969) (0.137) (0.119) (0.165)
Self-reported Poor Health 1.007*** -0.228 1.125*** -0.0475 0.980*** -0.181
(0.155) (0.197) (0.126) (0.139) (0.163) (0.198)
Spouse Has Poor Health 0.183 0.0261 0.0655 -0.0308 0.198 -0.000279
(0.146) (0.200) (0.122) (0.164) (0.151) (0.202)
Have Defined Benefit (DB) -0.837*** -0.855*** -0.826*** -1.373*** -0.892*** -0.825***
(0.0938) (0.261) (0.0720) (0.244) (0.0971) (0.263)
Have Defined Contribute (DC) -1.843*** -0.438* -1.734*** -0.715*** -1.888*** -0.453**
(0.0965) (0.227) (0.0758) (0.210) (0.0988) (0.229)
Constant -42.61*** -28.01*** -36.74*** -17.53*** -36.69*** -32.41***
(2.482) (5.577) (2.344) (4.472) (2.569) (6.464)
Birth Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individuals 4,115 4,115 4,259 4,259 3,987 3,987
N 17,581 17,581 25,984 25,984 17,120 17,120
Bootstrapped Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.7: Sequential Logit Model for Retirement and Un-Retirement (Women)
(1) (2) (3)
Retire vs. Reentry vs. Retire vs. Reentry vs. Retire vs. Reentry vs.
Work Retire Work Retire Work Retire
Predicted Longevity -5.205*** 1.675*** -5.243*** 2.233***
(0.284) (0.328) (0.310) (0.379)
Subjective Pr(85+) -0.00259** 0.00325** -0.00121 0.00213
(0.00114) (0.00158) (0.00121) (0.00162)
Longevity × Initial Retirement Age -0.00260 -0.00165
(0.00183) (0.00186)
Initial Retirement Age 0.0271** 0.211 0.140
(0.0134) (0.140) (0.140)
Age 0.924*** 0.410*** 6.164*** -1.277*** 6.156*** -1.732***
(0.0815) (0.149) (0.296) (0.344) (0.323) (0.393)
Age2 -0.00541*** -0.00327*** -0.00596*** -0.00204 -0.00556*** -0.00312**
(0.000634) (0.00112) (0.000640) (0.00126) (0.000679) (0.00146)
Married 0.270 0.795*** -0.281 0.864*** -0.252 1.215***
(0.221) (0.290) (0.213) (0.286) (0.235) (0.306)
Partnered -0.217 -0.124 -0.291 0.151 -0.323 0.234
(0.326) (0.446) (0.315) (0.430) (0.346) (0.455)
Separated or Divorced -0.121 0.908*** -1.011*** 1.123*** -0.985*** 1.445***
(0.228) (0.303) (0.222) (0.302) (0.244) (0.323)
Widowed 0.134 0.959*** -0.575** 1.155*** -0.537** 1.429***
(0.230) (0.298) (0.225) (0.299) (0.246) (0.317)
Black 0.150 0.0812 -0.0836 0.219 -0.0255 0.181
(0.119) (0.157) (0.110) (0.139) (0.124) (0.159)
Hispanics -0.0270 -0.405 0.141 -0.453* 0.210 -0.541**
(0.149) (0.265) (0.142) (0.233) (0.157) (0.269)
GED 0.224 -0.0910 0.359* -0.0399 0.342 -0.190
(0.229) (0.280) (0.205) (0.254) (0.225) (0.297)
High School Grads. 0.131 -0.120 0.460*** -0.132 0.511*** -0.282*
(0.124) (0.167) (0.119) (0.153) (0.132) (0.169)
Some College -0.0682 0.0338 0.525*** -0.0838 0.549*** -0.222
(0.136) (0.189) (0.133) (0.177) (0.147) (0.192)
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Retire vs. Reentry vs. Retire vs. Reentry vs. Retire vs. Reentry vs.
Work Retire Work Retire Work Retire
College Above 0.141 0.202 0.529*** 0.233 0.493*** 0.104
(0.147) (0.203) (0.140) (0.187) (0.154) (0.200)
Total Assets in $1000 -2.51e-05 -0.000316** -1.59e-05 -0.000196* -3.00e-05 -0.000307**
(3.70e-05) (0.000126) (4.01e-05) (0.000106) (4.24e-05) (0.000125)
Covered by Medicaid 1.343*** -0.132 1.057*** 0.198 1.108*** 0.000866
(0.196) (0.202) (0.167) (0.178) (0.200) (0.206)
Covered by Medicare 0.436*** 0.258** 0.282*** 0.343*** 0.341*** 0.321**
(0.0780) (0.126) (0.0712) (0.124) (0.0811) (0.136)
Employer HI NOT Covering Retirement -0.650*** -0.209 -0.612*** -0.203 -0.715*** -0.243
(0.129) (0.282) (0.107) (0.234) (0.136) (0.291)
Employer-Provide Health Insurance 0.0820 -0.181 0.0521 -0.182 0.0690 -0.191
(0.0828) (0.135) (0.0765) (0.125) (0.0854) (0.136)
Covered by Spouse’s Health Insurance 0.243** -0.161 0.265*** -0.0896 0.218** -0.179
(0.105) (0.140) (0.0934) (0.126) (0.110) (0.140)
Self-reported Poor Health 0.826*** -0.140 0.620*** 0.164 0.297 0.0802
(0.160) (0.199) (0.163) (0.153) (0.182) (0.209)
Spouse Has Poor Health -0.347** -0.116 -0.102 0.0907 -0.369** -0.120
(0.155) (0.246) (0.156) (0.201) (0.173) (0.246)
Have Defined Benefit (DB) -1.234*** -0.589** -0.871*** -1.223*** -0.987*** -0.876***
(0.0999) (0.260) (0.0807) (0.264) (0.104) (0.269)
Have Defined Contribute (DC) -1.783*** -0.211 -1.452*** -0.688** -1.559*** -0.361
(0.103) (0.282) (0.0878) (0.271) (0.109) (0.287)
Constant -38.00*** -19.74*** -27.89*** -27.83*** -26.64*** -30.44***
(2.548) (4.999) (2.616) (6.604) (2.748) (6.780)
Birth Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individuals 3,463 3,463 3,528 3,528 3,433 3,433
N 16,151 16,151 21,815 21,815 15,756 15,756
Bootstrapped Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.8: Overly-pessimistic vs. Overly-optimistic Retirees at Initial Retirement Wave
Mean Difference
Overly-pessimistic Overly-optimistic Test (P-values)
Age 70.27 64.99 0.000
Male 88.14% 50.46% 0.000
Adjusted Total Assets 392874.70 309311.30 0.677
Changes in Total Assets 89197.19 20623.28 0.372
Adjusted Financial Assets 156314.10 83243.71 0.983
Changes in Financial Assets 36341.32 12260.12 0.826
Age of First Retirement 68.94 63.97 0.000
Average Predicted Longevity 77.14 66.81 0.000
Ever Reentered Labor Force 27.12% 27.66% 0.541
Cancer 10.53% 10.74% 0.593
Stroke 6.78% 4.57% 0.918
Diabetes 8.77% 14.75% 0.182
Lung Diseases 10.71% 7.62% 0.445
Heart Diseases 25.42% 17.79% 0.083
Poor Health 11.86% 6.31% 0.197
Covered by Employer Hlth. Insur. 28.81% 34.92% 0.153
Covered by Medicare 86.44% 49.74% 0.000
Currently Receiving Pension 53.45% 39.19% 0.156
Black 5.08% 17.54% 0.000
Hispanics 13.56% 7.80% 0.184
Married 91.53% 69.51% 0.000
Partnered 5.08% 2.48% 0.286
Separated or Divorced 0.00% 12.88% 0.000
Widowed 3.39% 11.90% 0.015
Never Married 0.00% 3.11% 0.000
Less Than High School 33.90% 20.28% 0.056
GED 5.08% 4.85% 0.674
High School Grads. 30.51% 31.97% 0.993
Some College 11.86% 21.25% 0.094
College Above 18.64% 21.62% 0.209
Max N 59 4310
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Table 1.9: Fixed Effects Model of Changes in Total Household Assets After Retirement (incl. 2nd
House)
Overly-pessimistic Overly-optimistic
Changes in Changes in
Total Assets Total Assets Total Assets Total Assets
Linear Time Trend -41,578* -14,250 8,973 -15,389***
(24,391) (14,577) (7,585) (5,538)
Time Trend Squared 4,111 -975.7
(2,534) (815.8)
Married -22,212 -61,761 27,255 12,218
(56,167) (97,562) (79,292) (119,125)
Partnered 71,781 10,375
(84,399) (126,306)
Separated or Divorced -41,880 81,113 -20,146 -17,983
(139,857) (224,687) (78,928) (118,613)
Widowed 2,995 22,612
(77,781) (116,663)
Cancer 66,753 -31,601 17,522 3,133
(57,376) (101,136) (21,991) (33,644)
Diabetes 10,417 47,078 4,500 19,943
(69,945) (111,615) (20,800) (31,649)
Heart Diseases 11,391 55,804 -12,103 -6,347
(41,842) (74,291) (18,178) (27,423)
Lung Diseases -146,513** -121,581 -11,251 10.22
(71,056) (121,109) (26,303) (39,775)
Stroke -28,580 -14,690 -26,187 15,655
(52,945) (88,584) (27,635) (41,635)
Self-reported Poor Health -18,954 -48,250 -6,672 131.3
(47,102) (79,519) (21,698) (32,667)
Constant 301,938*** 94,329 260,641*** 26,071
(76,794) (117,364) (78,955) (117,516)
Year Dummies Yes Yes
Observations 324 285 18,993 17,271
R-squared 0.066 0.047 0.005 0.004
Number of Individuals 59 58 4,269 4,190
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
50
Chapter 2
The Effect of Survival Risk on Labor
Supply: A Life-Cycle Model Approach
2.1 Introduction
In the past century, life expectancy has been increasing dramatically. Retirement life there-
fore has became one of the most important life events that needs our attention to plan
carefully both in terms of timing and retirement savings. From historical data of labor force
participation rates of male workers and life expectancy over the past century, the correlation
between increasing life expectancy and declining labor force participation rates has been dis-
cussed in the current literature (Eggleston and Fuchs, 2012; Kalemli-Ozcan and Weil, 2010).
Increasing life expectancy also implies a longer retirement life to finance. With a more
friendly working environment for older workers nowadays, we already observe greater labor
force participation rates for both genders since the mid-1990s. This essay aims to provide
evidence from a life-cycle model with endogenous labor supply and uncertain longevity to
examine the argument that people would work more at older ages when life expectancy in-
creases. In my life-cycle model, individuals are subject to two sources of idiosyncratic shocks:
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wage and health shocks. They can save and decumulate assets to smooth consumption and
invest in health to restore health stock from an adverse health shock. An experiment is
conducted to examine the effect of risk of mortality on retirement: in a environment with
a steeper survival curve at all ages, which implies a shorter life expectancy, how are labor
supply decisions made optimally, compared to the decisions in an environment with a less
steep survival curve? I find that in a favorable survival environment, individuals do choose
to work more at older ages, and spend more on medical care.
2.2 Literature and Motivation
Rust (1989) was one of the first to set up a dynamic programming model for retirement
behavior, which incorporates mortality risks into utility functions. Rust and Phelan (1997)
use this model and find that people with self-reported poor health have higher mortality
risks. They are also more likely to apply for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) or
claim Social Security retirement benefits early. The mortality risks are estimated only as a
function of self-rated health and marital status. Obviously, other factors such as genetics
can affect mortality as well. Ben´ıtez-Silva et al. (2006) enrich Rust and Phelan’s model
by incorporating Earnings Test of Social Security retirement benefits, Delayed Retirement
Credits, and taxation on other source of incomes at retirement. They simulate a three-period
life cycle model with various mortality risks and find that increasing risks of mortality at
the retirement period from baseline 20% to 25% would result in 58.2% of people claiming
Social Security early regardless of the great life-time penalty on Social Security paychecks.
This confirms that higher risk of mortality induces myopic behaviors.
Not many studies have linked a health production process with risk of subsequent mor-
tality. Hall and Jones (2007) model a health production function which directly relates to
mortality risk, but their functional assumption is theoretical and lacking in empirical sup-
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ports: they have a Cobb-Douglas production function for health, which produces the inverse
of non-accidental mortality rate. In fact, such a production function should rather be con-
sidered as the production of survival probability than production of health, which might
be far from the reality that individuals can not perfectly control their survival rates. They
specifically assume that health spending is a superior good with an income elasticity above
one. Therefore, as wealth accumulates with age and longevity, individuals will buy health
and directly prolong their life in order to purchase more periods of utility. As a result, health
share of spending will be increased to exceed 30% by 2050.
Hosseini (2008) is one of the first to introduce heterogeneity of risk of mortality in a
life-cycle model setup. He argues that individuals are born with different genetic types and
therefore will experience heterogeneous mortality process. Some people are naturally prone
to death and some are not, given everything is the same. Hence, an annuity for retirement
is purchased based with the knowledge of the heterogeneous propensity of death. There are,
however, no medical care purchase decisions involved in his model, and the mortality process
is predetermined and fixed at birth.
Inspired by Hosseini (2008), I introduce a similar framework of heterogeneous risk of
mortality. In addition, I also incorporate Hall and Jones’ (2007) idea to allow individuals to
invest in health, which could alter their survival rate. In other words, the survival rate is
set as a function of health. Therefore, not only do individuals have the knowledge of their
genetic types that determines their propensity of death compared to the population average
level, they are also able to alter their survival probability through investing in health. This
setup is more realistic given the improving medical care technology and increasing share of
health spending. In summary, I examine the effect of increasing survival probability on labor
supply in a life-cycle model with endogenous labor, uncertain longevity and shocks in wage
and health.
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2.3 Model
Consider an individual maximizes his/her discounted remaining lifetime utility at age t,
t = 25, 26, ..., T . The discounted lifetime utility at age t takes the form:
U(ct, ht, lt) + Et
{
T∑
j=t+1
βjSj−1,t[sj(hj)U(cj, hj, lj) + (1− sj(hj))b(aj)]
}
(2.1)
where U(ct, ht, lt) is instantaneous utility at age t . It is a function of consumption ct, health
stock ht, and labor supply lt. I follow Hall and Jones (2007) in specifying the following form
for the utility function:
U(ct, ht, lt) = A+
c1−νct
1− νc + α
h1−νht
1− νh − γtlt (2.2)
where the parameter A denotes the value of being alive. It must be large enough to makes
the entire utility function positive (Hall and Jones, 2007). α is the value of health in utility
function. γt is disutility of full-time working. Labor supply is a continuous variable that
takes values between [0, 1]. lt = 1 means working full-time (say, 50 hours a week), and lt = 0
means not working at all. The reason of allowing a continuum of labor supply is to enable
individuals to optimally and freely choose their work intensity instead of being constrained
by contract. When the individual dies at age j, she values a bequest utility b(aj), which is
a function of the asset left aj. The bequest function takes the form:
b(aj) = φb
(aj + κ)
(1−νc)
1− νc (2.3)
where aj is the asset individual left if she dies at age j. κ is the parameter which determines
the curvature of the bequest function. If κ = 0 there is infinite disutility of leaving non-
positive bequests. If κ > 0, there is finite utility of leaving zero bequest.
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Sj,t is the cumulative probability of surviving to age j conditional being alive at age t:
Sj,t =
∏j
k=t sk(hk)
st(ht)
where sk(hk) is periodic survival rate at age k conditional on surviving to
age k−1 (French, 2005). The reason for dividing st(ht) in equation (2.1)is that the individual
has already survived to age t. The agent can live at most to a maximum age T = 100, hence,
sT+1 = 0. β is the time discount factor.
The individual faces a budget constraint at age t :
ct + at+1 +mt = yt + (1 + r)at (2.4)
at+1 > 0; (2.5)
ct > 0; (2.6)
where at+1 is savings at the end of age t, and mt is the medical expenditure. Savings yield
interest at a risk free rate of r. yt is income at age t:
yt = wtlt (2.7)
Individual’s income at age t comes from wage rate wt if she is working full time. As
working intensity decreases, received wage income decreases linearly. The life-cycle wage
profile follows a process
ln(wt) = W (ht, t) + ηt (2.8)
where the disturbance term follows an AR(1) process such that ηt = ρηt−1 + ξt, and ξt ∼
N (0, σ2ξ ) is i.i.d. noise. ρ captures the persistence in wage shocks. Wage rate W (ht, t) is a
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function of age, age squared, health, and interaction of age and health, and individual fixed
effects. The appearance of health in wage determination generates a health wage premium
(Grossman, 1972) such that healthy individuals earn more because of better work efficiency
or fewer sick days.
The agent’s health stock follows a health production function such that the agent is able
to improve health by utilizing medical care or participating in other health improvement
activities such as exercise, healthy life style, etc. The law of motion of health stock takes
the form:
ht = (1− δt)ht−1 + g(mt)− t (2.9)
The health stock is subjective to an age-dependent deterioration rate δt. Medical expen-
diture mt is chosen to improve health against an adverse health shock t, which is assumed to
be i.i.d and drawn from a standard normal distribution φ(). g(mt) is the health production
process that takes mt as inputs. The functional form of health production process will be
discussed in the next section.
As discussed before, medical expenditure can directly promote good health. More im-
portantly, it indirectly affects survival rate st(ht). Before getting into the details of how
individuals are shifting their survival curve through investing in health, let’s look at the
population survival curve first. The unconditional population survival probability of living
to age t can be written as:
St = Pr(τ ≥ t) = 1−G(t) = S(t,X) (2.10)
where the age of death τ is a random variable which is assumed to follow a distribution with
density of g(τ) and CDF of G(τ). Therefore S(t,X) is the survival function. X contains
health and other observed individual characteristics (See Section 2.5.3).
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Mortality risk varies across individuals due to many factors including observed factors
such as age, sex, education and marital status (Meyricke and Sherris, 2013), and unobserved
factors such as environment and genetics. Vaupel, Manton, and Stallard (1979) argues that
such unobserved factors can be interpreted as an individual’s ‘robustness’ of survival, a
lifelong property that can be viewed as a sum of genetic and environmental factors that
determine an individual’s likelihood of survival. That means, for instance, a less-robust
individual is more likely to die. In order to econometrically model such unobserved hetero-
geneity in risk of mortality, I incorporate a frailty term described as in Vaupel, Manton, and
Stallard (1979) and Butt and Haberman (2004), in which frailty is defined as the magnitude
of heterogeneous deviation in individual’s survival rates away from the population survival
curve. The consequences of ignoring the frailty term include failure of explaining the sys-
tematic heterogeneity that cannot be attributable to randomness, and underestimation of
the mortality rates at older ages due to mortality selection (Butt and Haberman, 2004).
Similar framework can be found in Hosseini (2008) in which he also models the mortality
heterogeneity by a frailty parameter such that people who were born with higher frailty are
more likely to die at each period. The value of frailty is fixed for the entire life.
I assume the frailty is represented as a random variable θ which follows a distribution
Θ(θ, σθ). The cumulative hazard of death up to age τ can be written as:
Haz(τ, θ,X) =
ˆ τ
0
haz(t, θ,X)dt = −ln(S(τ, θ,X)) (2.11)
where haz(t, θ,X) is the instantaneous hazard of mortality at age t. S(t, θ,X) is the survival
function conditional on the realization of frailty θ. Therefore, the unconditional population
probability of surviving to age t from birth can be obtained by integrating out the frailty
term:
57
Sθ(t,X) =
ˆ ∞
0
S(t, θ,X)Θ(θ, σθ)dθ (2.12)
Once controlling for X, Sθ(t,X) should be consistent with the cumulative survival prob-
ability population life table. From the parameters estimated in a survival model, we can
identify the extent to which an improving health ht can shift mortality hazard. Linking the
health production function, I can compute the marginal effect of medical expenditure on
periodic survival rates. In Section 2.5.3 I will discuss more about the functional specification
of the survival model and the health production function.
Notice that in this model, health has three roles. First, health directly generates utility,
in the sense that people enjoy good health. Second, good health promotes higher wages, and
consequently yields higher consumptions and higher utility. Third, improvement in health
will temporally reduce periodic mortality risk. On the other hand, different from Hall and
Jones (2007) where individuals have direct control over one’s own survival rates, I allow
individuals to alter their periodic survival rates only through demanding more health care to
improve health. This will rule out the possibility that individual can infinitely change their
survival rates, leading to a change in the population survival curve.
In summary, individual has a state vector xt = {ht, at, t, ηt, t} where ht is health (health
stock or health status); at is asset carried over from previous period; t is health shock; ηt is
AR(1) wage shock; and t is current age. Individual chooses {at+1, lt,mt}, that is, individual
chooses consumption, health investment, and labor supply at each period to maximize his/her
lifetime utility. The value function at each time period (where the variables with a prime
indicating the values in the next period) can be written as:
V (x) = max
a′,l,m
{u(c, h, l) + βE [s′(h′)V (x′) + (1− s′(h′))b(a′)]} (2.13)
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subject to equation (2.4) to (2.9).
At each period, denoted as age t, an exogenous health shock t occurs. The individual si-
multaneously choose the optimal labor supply, medical expenditure, and saving to determine
his/her wage income, health status, and conditional survival probability to age t+ 1. After
solving this life-cycle model, I simulate different economic scenarios to find the effect of in-
creasing unconditional population survival probability on individual’s labor supply, medical
expenditures, and savings holding other factors constant.
2.4 Data
I use 10 waves of the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) from 1992 to 2010. HRS is
a longitudinal biennial survey on representatives for older Americans. I include not only
the core HRS respondents, who are defined as those participated the 1992 interview and
were born between 1931 to 1941, but also other cohorts such as AHEAD (born 1923 and
earlier), CODA (Children of Depression, born 1924-1930), and War Babies (born 1942-1947).
The CODA and War Babies cohorts were introduced into the survey in 1998. The survival
analysis in the next section has taken care of the late entry of the CODA and War Babies. I
did not include anyone who were in nursing home. I follow these respondents until the latest
2010 wave or the time when they died.
2.5 Estimations and Calibrations
2.5.1 Health Dynamics
The first order question is the measurement health. Since Charlson comorbidity scores
only account for diagnosed diseases, individuals with same Charlson comorbidity scores may
actually have different levels of healthiness. In other words, healthiness is not equivalent to
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not being sick. In addition, many listed diagnosed diseases were not asked in HRS surveys.
Therefore, I use factor analysis to generate a factor that contains information on physical
mobilities such as whether the respondent is having difficulties in taking a bath, dressing
himself/herself, eating, going to bed, and walking through a room by oneself; CESD mental
health scores summarizing feeling of depression, sadness, loneliness, effortlessness, happiness,
and enjoyment of life; self-reported health status; and diagnosed diseases such as heart
diseases, diabetes, having a stroke in the past two months, lung diseases, cancer, high-blood
pressure, arthritis, and psychiatric problems.
All the health and disease indicators are coded in the way that they take the value of
1 if the individual has no such conditions, 0 if he/she has. The CESD score is calculated
as “8−numbers of conditions”, so does the ADLA score by “5−numbers of conditions”.
Self-reported health takes the value of 1 corresponding to very poor health, and 5 meaning
excellent health. By recoding these variables, the direction of these indicators goes the same
way with the concept of health stock. That means a higher score is linked with less adverse
health conditions and better health. Therefore, I can directly use this common factor as the
measurement of health stock. Since all the variables are discrete binary or ordinal variables,
principle component Analysis cannot be applied here. I use the Polychoric correlation be-
tween these discrete variables as the input for factor analysis. The idea of the polychoric
correlation is that the ordinal variables are discretized latent random variables that follow
a joint normal distribution. The polychoric correlation coefficient is the correlation between
two jointly normally distributed latent random variables. For ordinal variables, the discretiz-
ing thresholds can also be estimated to maximize the log-likelihood function of a bivariate
normal distribution just like a ordered Probit model in univariate case. This correlation is
fairly robust with respect to the distributional violation (Coenders, Satorra, and Saris, 1997;
HolgadoTello et al., 2010).
After getting the polychoric correlation coefficient matrix for each pair of these health
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indicators, I can use it in the usual factor analysis routine. It turns out that only one factor
is sufficient to capture the variations in all of these 11 variables. Table 2.2 shows that only
the first factor has an eigenvalue greater than one. It can explain 95% of the variations. 1
This factor will then be used as underlying health stock. With the factor loading matrix in
Table 2.3, the health factor can be constructed as a linear combination of these 11 variables.
The validity of the generated health factor can be shown in Figure 2.1. The correlation
between health factor and self-reported health is very high, which is not surprising because
it is generated by self-reported health and other health related variables. Another way to
compare generated health measure and self-reported health is plotted in Figure 2.2. The
blue line is kernel density of health factor. The vertical lines are average values of health
factor for each category of self-reported health. The better the self-reported health is, the
higher the average values of health factor is.
With this continuous health variable, I can estimate health equation consistently with
the Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator. Recall that the health stock equation is:
ht = (1− δt)ht−1 + g(mt)− t (2.14)
δt is age-dependent depreciation rate of health stock. I include interactions of 7 age group
dummies (younger than 39, age 40-49, age 50-59, age 60-69, age 70-79, age 80-89, and older
than 90) with lagged health to estimate the δt. I assume the functional form for health pro-
duction g(mt) = ψ1mt + ψ2m
2
t .
2 A polynomial of medical expenditure as health production
process can flexibly capture diminishing return to scale in a health capital model (Ehrlich
and Chuma, 1990; Galama et al., 2012). In addition, medical expenditure is endogenous
1Whether to allow rotations of the factors is not making a difference here because eventually there will be
only one factor chosen. Unless I force to use two factors, then the rotation leads to the cost of deteriorating
the quality of first factor in order to introduce a second factor (some loading coefficients of the first factor
will then be negative).
2When I fit the Blundell-Bond estimation, higher order polynomials of medical expenditure mt is dropped
because of collinearity.
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to health, i.e, sicker people spend more on health. Failure to address the possible reverse
causality will lead to bias, even negative correlation between medical expenditures and levels
of health. Therefore, in the Blundell-Bond GMM estimator, polynomials of medical expen-
ditures enter as endogenous variables. In the difference equations, they will be instrumented
by the 2nd and higher orders of lagged values; in the level equations the instruments are 2nd
and higher order of lags of the first-difference values. Specifically, health equation becomes:
ht =
G∑
g=1
Dght−1 + ψ1mt + ψ2m2t − t (2.15)
where Dg is coefficient of 7 age group dummies described above. It is clear that for each age
group, δg = 1−Dg. The estimation results for equation (2.15) is in Table 2.4.
Interestingly, I find that health does not depreciate much before age 50. The decreasing
coefficients of interactions terms indicating that health starts to rapidly depreciate after
age 50 in an increasing rate. The δt for each age group therefore will be equal to one
minus the coefficients of interaction terms. For example, from age 50 to 59, the depreciation
rate of health stock is 1− 0.986 = 0.014. Moreover, I find positive relation between medical
expenditure and health stock. This finding is similar to the literature, though the magnitude
of the coefficient is not comparable due to different measurement of health. The coefficient
can be interpreted as: an additional $1000 increase in out-of-pocket medical expenditure in
one year can increase health stock by 6.6 percentage points.
2.5.2 Wage Rate
Wage income is measured in a year which includes income and bonuses from first and sec-
ondary jobs. There might exist sample selection issues such that only those who have high
wage income would stay in the labor market, given the higher cost of working at older ages.
Therefore, I use a modified Heckman two-stage routine to correct the selection bias that
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people who are out of the labor force may be systematically different from those in. First,
I estimate a probit model with random effect for labor force participation decisions at each
period. Specifically, the underlying latent variable for labor supply of individual i at age t
is:
d∗it = Vitχ+ νi + uit (2.16)
The covariates Vit includes: spousal labor force status, age, health insurance coverage indi-
cator, total household assets, health measurement, marital status, educational attainments,
gender, ethnicity, and interview year dummies. We only observed discrete labor force par-
ticipation status dit:
dit =

1 if d∗it ≥ 0
0 if d∗it < 0
(2.17)
The selection problem is that:
wobsit =

wit if dit = 1
missing if dit = 0
(2.18)
where wobsit is observed wage rate. It is yearly earnings in dollars. For non-workers, their
potential wage rates are not observed. It is possible that the individual random effect νi is
correlated with Vit. I follow Mundlak (1978) proposed method and assume that:
νi = Viζ + %i (2.19)
where Vi is the average of Vit. %i is uncorrelated with Vi. Therefore, equation (2.16) can be
re-written as:
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d∗it = Vitχ+ Viζ + %i + uit (2.20)
and I can estimate equation (2.20) with random-effect probit model. From the probit model,
I can get the linear prediction: Vˆit = Vitχˆ+ Viζˆ. Since the Inverse Mill Ratio from Heckman
selection model is a non-linear function of Vˆit, I add third-order polynomial of Vˆit into wage
equation.
The first stage probit model of labor force participation decisions is displayed in Table
2.5. Most coefficients are showing the reasonable sign. Whether the spouse is working has a
great impact on one’s labor force participation decision, which supports the joint retirement
hypothesis (Hurd, 1990). As people get older, they are less likely to keep working. Compared
to high school dropouts, individuals with higher educational level would be more likely to
stay in the labor force.
The wage equation with a AR(1) disturbance term is the following:
ln(wit) = φageit + φ2age
2
it + φ3healthit + φ4ageit × healthit + β1educ
+β2gender + β3marital status+ β4Vˆit + β5Vˆ 2it + β6Vˆ
3
it + µi + ηit
(2.21)
where ηit is an AR(1) disturbance term: ηit = ρηit−1 + ξit. µi is individual random effects.
To estimate equation (2.21), I use Prais–Winsten GLS estimator with individual random
effects. The results are in Table 2.6. The coefficients from a regression without Heckman
correction (first column of Table 2.6) is biased compared to bias-corrected estimates (second
column of Table 2.6). Coefficients of interest are the curvature of wage profile with age and
the wage premium of being healthy. I do find evidence of healthy wage premium, but such
wage premium decreases with age.
The estimated serial correlation coefficient in the error term is 0.5. While solving the
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life-cycle model, I discretize the continuous AR(1) shocks into a four-state Markov Chain
with Tauchen’s method (Tauchen, 1986). The transition matrix for evolving from one shock
to another was tabulated in Table 2.7.
2.5.3 Mortality Process
For estimating the hazard of mortality, I use a discrete-time proportional hazard model. The
instantaneous hazard for person i who was observed at time interval j = (tj−1, tj] takes the
form:
haz(θi, Xij) = 1− exp[−exp(Xijβ + ln(θi) + h0,ij)] (2.22)
where Xij includes health stock hij, genetic factors related to family mortality propensities
such as parents’ living status, indicators of whether they died before age 50, parents’ years
of education, smoking behaviors, residential census regions, polynomials of BMI, age, total
household assets, diagnosed diseases, and educational attainments. h0,ij is the baseline
hazard function, which I assume to take the “Weibull” form, i.e., a linear function of current
age observed at time interval j. θi is the frailty term. The distribution of the frailty θi
is assumed to follow a Gamma distribution g(θ) with mean 1 and variance σ2θ . σ
2
θ will be
estimated from the data. The coefficient of interest βh relates to what extent individuals
can deviate their risk of mortality from population survival curve through changes in health
stock. Estimation employs a maximum likelihood method. According to Meyer (1990), this
log-likelihood function has a closed form, which looks like:
lnL =
N∑
i=1
ln{
ˆ
exp[−θi
Ti−1∑
j=1
exp(Xijβ + h0,ij)]dg(θi)− pii
ˆ
exp[−θi
Ti∑
j=1
exp(Xijβ + h0,ij)]dg(θi)}
(2.23)
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where pii = 1 if this individual’s mortality is not censored, i.e., this person does not die, by
the end of period j. Ti indicates total number of episodes this individual is observed during
the entire analysis time. Once I estimate the coefficient of healthij, say βh, together with
the functional form of hazard in equation (2.22), I can derive the marginal effect of health
on the period survival rate:
dsj
dhj
= −e(−eXjβθi+Xjβ)θiβh, which will be used in the simulation
process in Section 2.6. The estimation results are tabulated in Table 2.8.
Clearly, better health is associated with lower risk of mortality. This is the innovation
of this study that links survival probability to current health stock. It is therefore different
from Hosseini (2008) where individuals are locked by their mortality “types” throughout
their entire lives. In this study, I generalize it by endogenizing survival risk such that
frailer individuals can invest in health to live longer. This is realistic nowadays that medical
innovations and new treatment options help individuals with genetic flaws overcome long-
term health challenges. In addition, compared to Hall and Jones (2007) where individuals
have direct control over their survival probabilities, I only allow individuals to indirectly
affect their conditional period survival rates through a health production process and a
mortality process. These two processes assures that medical expenditures can only improve
health by limited amount. This rules out the possibility that the unconditional population
survival curve would be altered by individuals’ personal choices. In other words, on average,
the underlying population survival curve remains the same.
Other results are not a primary focus in this study but are still interesting. For example,
BMI has a non-linear relationship with mortality such that too low and too high BMI are both
related with higher risk of mortality. Currently smoking contributes to higher subsequent
mortality. Marriage has a protecting effect, so does higher education attainments such as
college and college above degrees. Compared to women, men experience higher risk of
mortality. Last, the variance of individual heterogeneity θ is 0.52, and a LR test of non-
existence of such heterogeneity is strongly rejected at 1% significance level.
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2.5.4 Solving the Model
I solve the individual maximization problem recursively. Since at age t = T = 100 the agent
will not survive to the next period T + 1, which implies sT+1(hT+1) = 0. There will be no
future utility to be taken into account except the utility from bequest, i.e., VT+1 = 0. At
age T , the agent chooses to maximize:
VT (xT ) = max
aT+1,lT ,mT
{uT (cT ,mT , lT ) + βb(aT+1)} (2.24)
subject to corresponding equations (2.4) to (2.9). From age T −1 backward, the agent solves
the maximization problem in equation (2.13).
2.6 Simulations and Experiments
I employ two survival curves for the U.S. male population calculated by Bell and Miller
(2005) in year 2000 and 2100. The experiment is as follows: in a new environment where
the baseline population survival curve is less steep at all ages in 2100, resulting in longer life
expectancy, how do individuals respond to such changes in mortality risk in terms of labor
supply, holding everything else constant? According to Bell and Miller (2005)’s prediction,
in the year of 2100, the life expectancy at birth is 83, compared to 74 in year 2000. The
cumulative population survival curves for each economy are plotted in Figure 2.3. The
conditional period survival probability st in Figure 2.8.
3 We can see that both cumulative
and conditional periodic survival rates are lower in 2000 than 2100 at all ages.
In particular, I simulate 100 identical individuals’ life-cycle labor supply, medical expen-
diture, and saving decisions under these two survival curves of 2000 and projected 2100. I
will call these two scenarios Survival 2000 and Survival 2100, respectively. All simulated
3Conditional on the value of individual frailty.
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individuals start with zero initial asset holdings, 25 units of initial health stock before age
25. All health production and depreciation of health remains the same. After solving the
model, I simulate the life-cycle path of wage shocks from the transition matrix in Table 2.6
and back up the actual life-cycle labor supply, medical expenditures, and periodic savings.
Simulating two groups of the identical individuals in different environments not only
provides perfect counterfactuals, i.e., same frailty value for the same individual, same de-
preciation rate of health, but also shields the results against potential biasedness in the
estimation of the parameters in previous sections. This is because all the estimated pa-
rameters and marginal effect of choice variables on state variables stay identical in both
environments. The only difference is the unconditional survival curve. Therefore, the main
conclusion of the simulation are not driven by choosing different sets of parameters.
The intensity of labor supply for the two simulated survival environments is in Figure
2.4. Labor supply is higher in Survival 2100 than in Survival 2000 especially at middle ages
(age 30 to late 50s). Even under similar health stock profiles (shown in Figure 2.6), agents
in Survival 2000 who are myopic and more pessimistic care less about future consumptions.
Therefore, working more and saving more are not attractive to impatient individuals. Figure
2.7 shows that individuals in Survival 2000 will not save as much as forward-looking individ-
uals in Survival 2100, especially at younger ages. This is true regarding medical expenditure
(shown in Figure 2.5). Since health stock directly enters the utility function, health in the
future is less important to impatient individuals. This finding is consistent with Hall and
Jones (2007). They find that allowing individuals to spend on health to extend life results
in individuals shifting consumption spending towards health as life expectancy increases.
Moreover, this result can also be seen across heterogeneous individuals within the same sur-
vival environment. That means frailer individuals are more likely to work less and save less
than more robust individuals. This suggests that heterogeneity in risk of mortality play a
great role in our life-cycle decisions. Any policies regarding labor supply should take into
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account such heterogeneity.
2.7 Conclusion
This essay studies the effect of decreasing risk of mortality on labor supply in a life-cycle
model by incorporating individual heterogeneity in mortality hazard and a health production
process that affects health, wage rate, and survival probability. Health plays a key role in
this model. First, it appears in utility function that people value good health. Second,
it promotes higher wage earnings. Third, improvement of health would increase expected
longevity to be able to purchase more future utility. At each period, individuals decide how
much to work, how much to consume and save, and how much medical care to demand in
order to improve current health and increase periodic survival probability in the next period.
After simulating and comparing two groups of identical individuals’ life-cycle profiles of
labor supply, medical expenditure, and savings under survival rates of year 2000 and year
2100 (when in 2100 the average life expectancy at birth would be predicted to increase
by 9 years), I find that people work significantly more at middle ages 30-55 in 2100. In
addition, individuals save more and spend more on health care, especially at young ages.
The contributions of this essay are the following. First, it provides a new way of constructing
a measurement of health given the information of subjective and objective health, diagnosed
diseases, physical difficulties and mental health. Second, it is one of the first studies that
explicitly incorporate unobserved heterogeneous mortality risk in a life-cycle model and link
that to a health production function that affect not only wage income, current health, but
also future survival probabilities. That means individual’s survival rates are endogenous in
this model. More specifically, individuals are born to be more robust or vulnerable to force
of mortality due to unobserved factors such as genetics. At the same time they are allowed
to spend on health and improve their survival probability. By doing so I link mortality
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and health similarly to the aging process in the real world. In the future, there might be
other factors changing simultaneously with survival probabilities, for example, improvement
in medical care technology. But the combined impact of greater health production efficiency
and higher survival probability could be inconclusive due to existence of both income and
substitution effects. That’s the reason why I do not incorporate other changing factors in
my simulation of Survival 2100 in order to isolate the effect of mortality risk on labor supply.
There are limitations of this study. First, I do not include any social welfare programs
such as unemployment insurance and retirement pensions. This study aims to isolate the
effect of changing risk of mortality on labor supply, therefore I decided to drop other con-
founding factors that would significantly affect individuals’ labor market decisions. This may
contribute to my simulation results that labor supply at very old age is nonzero. Second,
some of the estimates, for example the ones in the health production equation, may not nec-
essarily be strictly econometrically consistent but they are estimated to pick up the general
correlation of variables of interest when there are no other covariates modeled in the simu-
lation. The future research direction will be to relax the assumption that individuals have
perfect information about their frailty types, and to investigate into the learning process of
their own survival chance.
70
2.8 Appendix
2
4
6
8
10
12
H
ea
lth
 F
ac
to
r
Poor Fair Good Very good Excellent
Self-reported health
Health factor Fitted values
Health Factor vs Self-reported Health (Men, 1992)
Figure 2.1: Health Factor vs. Self-reported Health
71
Poor Fair Good Very good Excellent0
.
05
.
1
.
15
.
2
.
25
D
en
si
ty
0 5 10 15
health
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.3097
Kernel Density of Health measure for men in 1992
Figure 2.2: Health Factor Kernel Density and Self-reported Health Status
72
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Age
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 P
ro
ba
bi
lity
 o
f S
ur
viv
al
 to
 A
ge
 t
Survival Curve of U.S. in 2000 and 2100
 
 
Baseline Survival in 2000
Projected Survival in 2100
Figure 2.3: Survival Curve of U.S. in 2000 and 2100
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Table 2.1: Polychoric Correlation Matrix
No Heart
Diseases
No Stroke No Dia-
betes
No Can-
cer
No Lung
Diseases
No Hy-
perten-
sion
No Psy-
cho.
No
Arthritis
8-CESD 5-ADLA Self-rated
Health
No Heart Dis-
eases
1
No Stroke 0.376 1
No Diabetes 0.264 0.233 1
No Cancer 0.154 0.100 0.073 1
No Lung Dis-
eases
0.309 0.185 0.105 0.145 1
No Hyperten-
sion
0.317 0.338 0.409 0.092 0.136 1
No Psycho. 0.193 0.166 0.149 0.059 0.298 0.175 1
No Arthritis 0.262 0.177 0.195 0.157 0.261 0.284 0.264 1
8-CESD 0.180 0.196 0.161 0.040 0.252 0.150 0.434 0.221 1
5-ADLA 0.118 0.224 0.110 -0.022 0.181 0.057 0.179 0.131 0.403 1
Self-rated
Health
0.412 0.364 0.398 0.180 0.404 0.345 0.349 0.348 0.449 0.279 1
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Table 2.2: Factors Explanatory Power
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Factor1 2.69331 2.09605 0.9492 0.9492
Factor2 0.59726 0.33695 0.2105 1.1597
Factor3 0.2603 0.11728 0.0917 1.2515
Factor4 0.14302 0.13671 0.0504 1.3019
Factor5 0.00632 0.03845 0.0022 1.3041
Factor6 -0.03213 0.03437 -0.0113 1.2928
Factor7 -0.06651 0.07802 -0.0234 1.2693
Factor8 -0.14453 0.01786 -0.0509 1.2184
Factor9 -0.16239 0.02749 -0.0572 1.1612
Factor10 -0.18988 0.07754 -0.0669 1.0943
Factor11 -0.26742 . -0.0943 1
Table 2.3: Factor loadings
Variable Factor1 Uniqueness
No Heart Diseases 0.5409 0.7074
No Stroke 0.4937 0.7563
No Diabetes 0.4554 0.7926
No Cancer 0.2018 0.9593
No Lung Diseases 0.4772 0.7722
No High Blood Pressure 0.4919 0.758
No Psychological Problems 0.4834 0.7664
No Arthritics 0.4685 0.7805
8-CESD 0.5425 0.7057
5-ADLA 0.3654 0.8665
Self-rated Health 0.7471 0.4419
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Table 2.4: Health Production Function
Health
Healtht−1× Age 6 39 1.006***
(0.0141)
Healtht−1× Age 40-49 1.001***
(0.00495)
Healtht−1× Age 50-59 0.986***
(0.00182)
Healtht−1× Age 60-69 0.975***
(0.00175)
Healtht−1× Age 70-79 0.966***
(0.00193)
Healtht−1× Age 80-89 0.951***
(0.00267)
Healtht−1× Age > 90 0.930***
(0.00646)
Medical Expenditure ($1000) 0.0659***
(0.00675)
Medical Expenditure 2 -6.64e-05*
(3.76e-05)
Observations 110,654
Number of Individuals 24,511
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.5: Random Effect Probit for Labor Force Participation
Working
Spouse in Labor Market 0.529***
(0.0219)
Age -0.173***
(0.00455)
Total Household Assets -1.67e-08
(1.38e-08)
Married 0.322
(0.982)
Partnered 0.0197
(0.981)
Divorced or Separated -0.580
(1.037)
Widow 1.029
(1.314)
Spouse in Labor Market 0.542***
(0.0454)
Age 0.0540***
(0.00504)
Total Household Assets 5.87e-08*
(3.04e-08)
Married 0.0951
(0.0608)
Partnered 0.0972
(0.172)
Divorced or Separated 0.164
(0.176)
Widow 0.209*
(0.126)
GED 0.241***
(0.0721)
High School 0.547***
(0.0430)
Some College 0.699***
(0.0465)
College and Above 1.109***
(0.0496)
Male 0.947***
(0.0313)
Black -0.0599
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(0.0442)
Hispanics -0.158***
(0.0494)
Constant 4.986***
(0.994)
Interview Year Dummy Yes
Observations 104,892
Number of Individuals 24,512
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.6: Fixed Effect Wage Equation with AR(1) Disturbance Term
(1) (2)
Age 0.196*** 0.236***
(0.00774) (0.0117)
Age2 -0.00178*** -0.00204***
(5.53e-05) (9.31e-05)
Health Stock 0.167*** 0.176***
(0.0189) (0.0240)
Health × Age -0.00203*** -0.00215***
(0.000325) (0.000419)
Vˆ 0.0665***
(0.0169)
Vˆ 2 0.0138***
(0.00430)
Vˆ 3 -0.00560***
(0.00142)
Married 0.0956*** 0.406
(0.0320) (0.601)
Partnered 0.0871** 0.394
(0.0387) (0.600)
Divorced or Separated 0.166*** 0.574
(0.0340) (0.720)
Widow 0.0964***
(0.0367)
GED 0.275*** 0.249***
(0.0350) (0.0409)
High School 0.322*** 0.291***
(0.0214) (0.0274)
Some College 0.559*** 0.506***
(0.0222) (0.0296)
College and Above 0.938*** 0.851***
(0.0227) (0.0338)
Male 0.536*** 0.530***
(0.0139) (0.0221)
Black 0.0248 0.0690***
(0.0185) (0.0232)
Hispanics -0.0326 -0.0302
(0.0236) (0.0272)
Constant 3.140*** 1.408*
(0.303) (0.736)
ρ 0.462 0.496
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Modified Bhargava et al. DW 1.291 1.253
Baltagi-Wu LBI 2.018 2.046
Observations 61,468 39,410
Number of Individuals 20,669 14,977
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.7: Transition Matrix of Markov-Chain and Values for Wage Shocks
Shock 1 Shock 2 Shock 3 Shock 4 Values of Shocks
Shock 1 0.3534 0.5180 0.1245 0.0041 -2.2640
Shock 2 0.1289 0.5183 0.3232 0.0296 -0.7547
Shock 3 0.0296 0.3232 0.5183 0.1289 0.7547
Shock 4 0.0041 0.1245 0.5180 0.3534 2.2640
86
Table 2.8: Hazard Model with Gamma Frailty
Health Stock -0.277***
(0.00820)
Mother Died Before 50 -0.00212
(0.0650)
Father Died Before 50 -0.0194
(0.0632)
Father’s Education 0.00103
(0.00736)
Mother’s Education -0.00666
(0.00818)
Mother Alive -0.0876
(0.0678)
Father Alive -0.156
(0.112)
BMI -0.175***
(0.0140)
BMI2 0.00218***
(0.000220)
Smoking Now 0.393***
(0.0503)
Black 0.0116
(0.0554)
Male 0.707***
(0.0391)
Hispanic -0.339***
(0.0750)
Married -0.406***
(0.0955)
Partnered -0.0837
(0.138)
Divorced or Separated -0.105
(0.105)
Widow -0.193**
(0.0979)
GED -0.131
(0.0955)
High School -0.0350
(0.0474)
Some College -0.0154
(0.0546)
College Above -0.111*
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(0.0620)
Total Household Assets -1.32e-07***
(4.11e-08)
Employed -0.601***
(0.0551)
Age 0.0728***
(0.00248)
Constant -3.660***
(0.471)
Census Region Yes
VAR(θ) 0.5244337
(0.0805)
Observations 107,118
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: LR test of VAR(θ)= 0: χ2(01) = 56.3382, P-value=0.000
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Table 2.9: Parameters of the Model
Parameters Description Value Source
β Time Discount Factor 0.98
r Real Interest Rate 0.02
νc Risk Aversion 3 Nardi, French, and Jones (2010)
νh Value of Health Parameter 1.15 Hall and Jones (2007)
A Value of Being Alive 26 Hall and Jones (2007)
φb Weight on Bequest Utility 0.4 Hosseini (2008)
κ Curvature of Bequest Function $4,000 French (2005)
α Weight on Health in Utility 0.39 Nardi, French, and Jones (2010)
δt Depreciation of Health Stock Age 6 39, δ = −0.006 Estimated from Equation (2.15)
Depreciation of Health Stock 40<Age 649, δ = −0.001 Estimated from Equation (2.15)
Depreciation of Health Stock 50<Age 659, δ = 0.014 Estimated from Equation (2.15)
Depreciation of Health Stock 60<Age 669, δ = 0.025 Estimated from Equation (2.15)
Depreciation of Health Stock 70<Age 679, δ = 0.034 Estimated from Equation (2.15)
Depreciation of Health Stock 80<Age 689, δ = 0.049 Estimated from Equation (2.15)
Depreciation of Health Stock 90<Age, δ = 0.07 Estimated from Equation (2.15)
ψ1, ψ2 Medical Expenditure Efficiency ψ1 = 0.066, ψ2 = −6.6× 10−5 Estimated from Equation (2.15)
φ1, φ2 Curvature of Wage Profile φ1 = 0.236,φ2 = −0.00204 Estimated from Equation (2.21)
φ3, φ4 Health Wage Premium φ3 = 0.176, φ4 = −0.00215 Estimated from Equation (2.21)
VAR(θ) Variance of Frailty θ 0.5244 Estimated from Equation (2.22)
βh Effect of Health on Mortality Hazard -0.27 Estimated from Equation (2.22)
γt Disutility of Working e
−8 to e−4 Imrohorog˘lu and Kitao (2012)
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Chapter 3
Are Older Workers Crowding Out
Younger Workers?
3.1 Introduction
With increasing healthy life expectancy and the anticipation of decreases in future Social
Security benefits, both life-cycle model and empirical studies have found that people with
greater life expectancy work longer. In addition, recent Social Security reforms including
increased full retirement age and more generous Delayed Retirement Credits are both aiming
to delay retirement of elderly workers. From the labor supply side, more friendly working
environments and protection discriminatory termination from Old Age Act passed in 1972
have enabled older workers to keep working or seeking employment at later ages. A healthy
and rational retiree may also find it beneficial to their mental and physical health to partici-
pate a moderate level of work after retirement. In fact, labor force participation rates of male
workers age 60-69 have increased since the middle of the 1990s. Female labor participation
for those age 50-69 has been increasing during the last five decades. Figure 3.1 shows such
trends in labor force participation rates of the elderly for both genders since 1961 to 2014.
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These factors have raised concern among some policy makers that higher labor force
participation rates for the elderly will crowd out employment opportunities of the youth,
given that older workers are somewhat good substitutes of younger workers in many indus-
tries. Employing the “Lump of Labor” fallacy Gunton (1889) argued that there is a fixed
amount of work to be done in an economy, and that any increase in work performed by some
workers reduces the job opportunities of other workers. While this may appear sensible, it
ignores the fact that the dynamics of the economy with technology innovations and popu-
lation growth would enable the labor market to absorb more labor with different skills and
experience. Moreover, even if there is some competition among different working age groups,
there might be heterogeneity in substitution across occupational types.
This chapter aims to examine whether older workers crowd out younger workers by
utilizing a natural experiment that induces greater labor force participation from workers
who are pre-retirement age. Comparing employment rates of the younger population before
and after the unanticipated policy change, I can estimate the changes of employment rate for
the youth as a result of the changing labor force participation rates (LFPR) for the elderly.
In addition, I find heterogeneous relationships between age groups across occupations.
The natural experiment exploited in this study is a reduction in Social Security benefits
(or “notch”) for cohorts born between 1917 and 1921 due to the 1977 Amendments to
the Social Security Act, a correction of a double indexation mistake in the cost-of-living
adjustment (COLA) in Social Security benefits calculations. The Amendment created a large
reduction in Social Security benefits for the “Notch Generation” relative to the preceding
cohorts. Because of the substantial gap in life-time Social Security income between adjacent
cohorts born before and after 1916 and unexpectedness of such change, this Social Security
“notch” has been utilized to examine income effect of Social Security income on labor supply,
mortality, and health at old ages (see, for example, Krueger and Pischke, 1992 and Snyder
and Evans, 2006).
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The size of benefit reduction is substantial. On average, the 1917 birth cohort received
about $50 per month less than the 1916 cohort (Snyder and Evans, 2006). The reduction
rate could have been even higher as retirement age increases. Krueger and Pischke (1992)
documented that notch generations received as much as 13% lower benefits than the pre-
notch generation if they retired at age 65. Given such large reductions in Social Security
income, individuals may keep working longer due to the income effect. Figure 3.2 and 3.3
show the evidence of induced greater employment rate for the notch cohorts. The downward
trend of employment rate of cohorts born before 1917 are unaffected by the notch in 1977,
while cohorts born in and after 1917 are higher since 1977. This distinction is especially
noticeable for men.
Given the similar economic and social experiences between the two groups of pre-notch
and post notch generations as shown in first two columns in Table 3.1 (similar gender and
ethnicity compositions, marital status, and educational attainments), greater LFPR of the
notch generation can only be explained by the reduction in Social Security benefits. Figure
3.2 and 3.3 also show a common trend of employment rate for both pre-notch and notch
cohorts before the policy intervention, which supports the validity of a difference-in-difference
estimation strategy that treated and control group are comparable in terms of outcome of
interest before the experiment.
Using a difference-in-difference (DD) model and data from March Current Population
Survey from 1972 to 1981, I find a significant increase of employment rates of the notch
generation compared to pre-notch generation. Given this increase of employment rates of
pre-retirement age workers, I then examine whether there is a decrease of employment rate
of younger workers. Using a fixed-effect model for cohorts born 1938-1952, I do not find any
crowding-out effect. Moreover, I do not find any significant negative impact on the wage
rates of young workers, either.
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3.2 Literature
Gruber, Milligan, and Wise (2009) review a series of studies conducted in multiple countries,
including the US, UK and other European countries, examining whether the encouragement
of late retirement would reduce the job opportunities for younger workers. None find evidence
supporting the Lump of Labor fallacy. Instead, they find that the increase of employment
of older workers is associated with greater employment opportunities of the youth. The only
drawback of these studies is that they focus on the employment rate, rather than the wages
or the working hours of the young employees. It is possible that the higher employment rate
of older workers would not crowd out younger workers, but would compress their promotion
opportunities and starting rate of wages.
Munnell and Wu (2012) test the Lump of Labor hypothesis of baby boomers against
young workers. After instrumenting for older workers’ employment rates with state-year-age
specific mortality rates, they do not find evidence of older workers crowding out employment
of the youth. There is no effect on younger workers’ wages either. They find that the
result persists even during the Great Recession. They conclude that greater employment of
older workers reduces unemployment and increases wage rate of the young workers. Their
work exploited the average movement of employment over time between age groups, and
their findings cause heated discussions both in academia and the press. There might be
more room to improve their study in order to be more convincing. First, there might be
heterogeneous substitution effects across occupations. For example, old workers might be
better substitutes for younger workers in low-skill level or blue-collar jobs than in high skill
level, white-collar jobs. Second, their fixed-effect model does not rule out the long-run trend
of increasing of older workers’ labor force participation since late 1990s and the possibility
of reverse causality from greater employment rates to decreasing risk of mortality. Last,
no explanation is provided why higher employment of older workers would lead to better
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outcomes of the youth. Maybe there is tutoring effect of older workers on younger workers,
which might also vary across occupations.
In this essay I identify the relationship between younger and older workers without the
confounding long-term time trends and other unobserved factors affecting both age groups.
By utilizing an exogenous policy change that induces changes in labor supply of the elderly,
I examine the short-run competition between these two groups both in terms of employment
and wage.
3.3 Estimation Strategy and Models
I employ a difference-in-difference model and a fixed-effect model to examine the relationship
between older and younger workers. Given the similar socio-economic status and macroeco-
nomic experiences of adjacent pre-notch cohorts and post-notch cohorts, they are perfectly
comparable for the purpose of a natural experiment. Table 3.1 and the next section will
discuss more in detail of these two groups’ characteristics.
Figure 3.4 demonstrates my estimation strategy. The difference-in-difference (DD) model
aims to prove that there exists a significant increase in labor force participation for the notch
generation. The pre-notch cohorts (birth cohorts 1910-1916) are used as the control group,
and the notch generations (birth cohort 1917-1921) are the treatment group. The fixed-
effect model examines the response of younger workers’ employment rates to an increase
of notch generation’s employment rate. Specifically, I chose three birth cohorts as study
groups. They are middle-age workers who were born 1938-1942, prime working-age cohorts
who were born 1943-1947, and young cohorts who were born 1948-1952. Figure 3.2 and 3.3
show the selected cohorts’ employment rates during 1970 and 1982 for both genders. We
can see clearly that all cohorts experience a similar trend in employment rates before 1977.
The notch generations (birth cohorts 1917 to 1921) have higher employment rates compared
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to the pre-notch cohorts in and after 1977. Therefore, a difference-in-difference model can
estimate the magnitude of such a difference by assigning notch generation as the treated
group and pre-notch generation as the control group. Specifically, the DD model can be
written as the following:
yct = α1Postt+α2Dc+δPostt×Dc+ηc+φ1cpre−trendst+φ2cpost−trendst+Xctβ+uct (3.1)
where yct is the employment rate that varies at cohort-year level; Postt is a dummy variable
that changes to value of one from 1977 forward; Dc is a dummy variable indicating the
treatment group, which is the notch generation that was born between 1917 and 1921. The
control group is the pre-notch generation that was born between 1910 and 1916 and had
higher Social Security benefits. ηc, pre − trendst and post − trendst are year cohort fixed
effects, cohort specific pre-notch and post-notch time trends, respectively. We can see in
Figure 3.2 and 3.3, notch generation’s employment rate not only experienced a one-time
intercept shift but also a slope change after the notch. Therefore, I add a set of cohort
specific pre-notch and post-notch time trends to captures the slope change. Xct is a set of
cohort characteristics including marital status, ethnicity, and educational obtainment. The
coefficient of interest is δ which captures the change in employment rate of notch generation
due to the Social Security notch.
Taking greater labor supply of the notch generation since 1977 as the treatment, I use a
set of fixed-effect models to estimate the response in employment rate of younger workers.
Specifically, the model can be written as:
zct = β1Postt + φ3cpre− trendst + φ4cpost− trendst + Agect +Xctβ + ct (3.2)
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where Postt is a dummy variable that changes to value of one after 1977 Amendment;
ηc is cohort fixed effects; pre − trendst and post − trendst are pre-notch and post-notch
cohort specific time trends; Agect are age fixed effects; Xct includes marital status, ethnicity,
and educational obtainment. Equation (3.2) is estimated separately for three groups of
interest: middle-age workers, prime-age workers, and young workers as described above.
The coefficient of interest is β1, which captures the difference of employment rates between
post-notch and pre-notch periods.
In addition, the effect of an increase in LFPR of the notch generation on wage rates of
the young workers are examined with the same set of fixed-effect models in equation (3.2).
The only difference is that the dependent variable is changed to a natural log of annual real
wage income. The standard errors of all models are clustered at the cohort level in case of
serial correlations of employment rate (or wage rate) over time within a cohort.
Lastly, it is possible that the aggregate employment rate change varies across occupations
due to various working environments and the skill requirement. Therefore, I re-aggregate
the data for each occupation (the occupational categories are presented in Table 3.12), and
re-estimate the fixed-effect model separately. By doing so, I find heterogeneous crowding-out
effects across occupations. The results are tabulated in Table 3.5, 3.6, 3.9, and 3.10. I will
discuss them in Section 3.5.
3.4 Data
I use March Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1972 to 1981, i.e., five years before
and after the 1977 Social Security Amendment. CPS surveys national representatives of
the U.S. population. Table 3.1 shows the characteristics of the all study groups at baseline
year of 1976. Gender and ethnicity compositions are balanced across cohort groups. Older
generations are more likely to be married or widowed, which is not surprising because marital
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status is highly correlated with age. Younger generations are more likely to have a high school
degree.
Employment rates are measured in actual values, such that 0.68 means 68% of the popula-
tion in that cohort at a particular year are employed. Employment is defined as self-reported
working, which does not include status of being unemployed or actively looking for jobs. I
exclude those in military services. Wage rate is annual earnings and it is converted to 1999
dollars.
For a difference-in-difference model to be valid, the trends of employment rate for treat-
ment and control groups should be parallel before policy change. From Figure 3.2 and 3.3,
we can see that the adjacent cohorts both pre-notch cohorts and notch cohorts share similar
trends in employment rates before 1977. Pre-notch cohorts (cohorts who were born before
1917) received higher Social Security benefits while the notch generation (birth cohort 1917-
1921) is affected by the policy and received lower benefits. Subsequently, employment rates
of these two groups see a divergence since 1977.
3.5 Estimation Results and Discussions
The results for the difference-in-difference model are in Table 3.2. I find that the notch
generation’s employment rate is indeed higher than pre-notch generations given everything
else constant. On average, notch generation’s employment rates are 25.2 and 12.1 percentage
points higher than pre-notch generation for men and women, respectively. This finding is
consistent to the literature that Social Security notch induces higher labor force participation
of the affected cohorts.
Given greater labor force participation of the notch generation members who are near
retirement age, the lump of labor would conclude that employment rate of younger workers
decreases. However, from Table 3.3 and 3.4, I do not find any crowding-out effect for all
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three groups of younger workers. On average, the response for male workers are all negative,
but none is statistically significant. In fact, a positive slope change for both genders after
Social Security notch for prime-age and middle-age workers suggest that their employment
rates are not affect by the notch in the long run, either. Among middle-age women, there
is even a slight increase in employment rates after notch. From the significantly positive
pre-notch and post-notch time trends for this group, we can tell it is due to a persistent
upward sloping trend in the labor force participation as indicated in Figure 3.1.
The breakdown of the notch impact on younger workers in different industries is shown
in Table 3.5 and 3.6 for men and women, respectively. I find heterogeneous crowding-
out effects against younger workers across occupations. For example, on average, a 25
percentage points higher in employment rate of male notch generation results in a decrease
in employment rate of middle-age male workers by 1.7 percentage points. Such crowding-
out effect is the greatest and most significant in the service industry: a decrease of 11.5
percentage points. Similarly, prime-age male operators, fabricators and laborers experience
a significant 9 percentage decrease. Among female workers, the crowding-out effect is the
strongest in prime-age managerial and professionals. For the youngest female workers, the
crowding-out effect is significantly negative in managerial professionals and farming, forestry
and fishing. This finding suggests that figures drawn from the population level can not be
generalized to all subgroups. Competition among different age groups varies in different
industries.
My finding of employment rate is consistent with the literature. Munnell and Wu (2012)
focus more on long-term labor market adjustment while my model estimates the short-run
effect of a one-time policy change. Moreover, Munnell and Wu’s analysis sample excludes
the years before the Social Security notch, which means that their findings do not include
the effect of the Social Security notch. The conclusions are similar that, on average, there is
no significant evidence supporting the crowding-out hypothesis. I do find that relationship
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among age groups may not be homogenous in different occupations. Some professionals are
affected more by the notch generation than others.
If there is no significant changes in the employment rate, what about wage income? The
effect of an increase of labor supply of the notch generation on younger workers’ wage income
are estimated and tabulated in Table 3.7 and 3.8 for men and women, respectively. I do
not find any significant decreases in wage income for all younger workers whatsoever. This
finding contrasts Munnell and Wu (2012)’s conclusion that the youth’s wage rate instead
increase with greater labor force participation of older workers.
Similar to employment rates, there are heterogenous responses in wage income across oc-
cupations as well, shown in Table 3.9 and 3.10. Because of log-level regressions, coefficients
in Table 3.9 and 3.10 can be interpreted as percentage changes after multiplication of 100.
I find a significant negative impact on wage income among prime-age male service work-
ers, operators, fabricators, laborers and prime-age female workers in precision production,
crafting, and repairing jobs.
3.6 Robustness Tests
One limitation of the March CPS data is that it is not possible to identify precisely the
year of birth. The imputation of birth cohort based on calendar year and current age will
overestimate 16% of the respondents’ year of birth, resulting in estimates of increment of
employment rates of notch generation biased downward. In other words, there are potentially
some individuals who were born in early 1917 and should have been included in Notch
generation (treatment group) are mistakenly assigned as being born in 1916 and are therefore
included in the control group. 1 To explore the impact of this error on my estimates, I re-
1For example, a person who was born in January in 1948 is responding the March CPS survey in 1979,
when he/she was 31. The formula (Calendar year – Current Age – 1 = Birth Year) will mistake him/her as
cohort of 1947.
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estimated the first DD model without the 1916 birth cohort. The result is shown in the second
and fourth columns of Table 3.11. We can see that after excluding 1916 cohort, the notch
effect is greater than the one estimated from the full-sample. It is not surprising because the
cohort of 1916 is the youngest among the control group and they reach retirement age later.
This increase in employment of notch generation, however, does not alter the conclusion of
potential crowding-out effect on the younger workers.
In addition, it is possible that the DD model captures some trivial fluctuations in em-
ployment rates that are caused by macroeconomic factors other than the Social Security
notch. I estimate a placebo test using 1970 as a pseudo policy change year, and the analysis
years range from 1965 to 1974. The result is shown in Table 3.11 column one and three. It
is obvious that there is no significant change in the employment rate of the notch generation
in 1970 at all.
Lastly, during the study period of 1972-1981, there is no other macroeconomic events
that promotes greater labor supply or demand of older workers. For example, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) which protects certain applicants and
employees age 40 and older from discrimination on the basis of age in hiring and promotion
of employment was implemented before the Social Security notch, and therefore should not
confound my estimation results.
3.7 Conclusion
The perception that there are a fixed number of jobs available in the economy has been used
in the U.S. immigration debate regarding the concern of crowding-out effect of immigrants
on local workers. Similar arguments have been raised regarding the crowding-out effect
of older workers against younger workers. This chapter uses a natural experiment that
exogenously induces greater labor market participation of workers age 56-60 in 1977 to
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examine the hypothesized crowding-out effect of older workers on younger workers, both
in terms of employment opportunities and wage rate. I find that on average, there is no
crowding-out effect on all young workers age 25-39. On the other hand, I find evidence of a
heterogeneous relationship between these two age groups across occupations. This suggests
that studies examining the substitution/complementary relationship of different groups of
workers should break down the analysis to different occupational categories. In addition,
no evidence is found to support that employment of notch generation compresses younger
workers’ wage income.
The finding of this essay can be interpreted as a short-run effect rather than a long-run
effect, because a difference-in-difference model and a fixed effect model can only capture
the impact of a one-time policy change. This essay provide further evidence that employ-
ment of older workers have no short-term nor long-run negative impact on younger workers
employment and income. The lump of labor hypothesis against older workers is strongly
rejected.
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Source: Author’s calculation. Data is from March Current Population Survey from 1962-
2014. Employment is defined as self-reported working. Employment rate is weighted to the
population level by age group and year.
Figure 3.1: Employment Rate of the Elderly in the US from 1962-2014
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Figure 3.2: Men’s Employment Rates for Adjacent Cohorts Before and After Social Security
Notch
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Figure 3.3: Women’s Employment Rates for Adjacent Cohorts Before and After Social Se-
curity Notch
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Figure 3.4: The Difference-in-Difference Strategy
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Table 3.1: Weighted Summary Statistics in 1976
Pre-notch Generations Notch Generation Stable Working Cohorts Prime Working Age Young Generation
Cohort 1910-1916 Cohort 1917-1921 Cohort 1938-1942 Cohorts 1943-1947 Cohorts 1948-1952
(Age 61-67 in 1977) (Age 56-60 in 1977) (Age 35-39 in 1977) (Age 30-34 in 1977) (Age 25-29 in 1977)
Employment Rates 39.67% 61.75% 71.87% 68.80% 69.95%
Age 62.90 56.89 35.96 30.94 26.00
Male 45.99% 47.49% 48.69% 48.71% 48.60%
Black 9.30% 8.45% 10.41% 9.81% 10.88%
Married 72.51% 76.89% 81.59% 78.35% 67.27%
Separated or Divorced 5.83% 8.19% 10.49% 10.43% 8.77%
Widowed 16.66% 9.50% 0.88% 0.49% 0.22%
Never Married 5.00% 5.42% 7.05% 10.73% 23.74%
Less than High School 80.26% 78.13% 63.79% 57.37% 51.71%
High School Degree 1.15% 1.33% 2.79% 2.88% 4.29%
Wage 3690.97 6067.58 7577.14 7025.12 5936.94
N 7942 6556 7685 9384 10827
Weighted Counts 12,715,983 10,560,694 12,071,620 14,908,326 17,275,711
Source: Author’s calculation from CPS March data.
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Table 3.2: Difference-in-Difference for Notch Generations
Men Women
Difference-in-Difference 0.252** 0.121**
(0.0909) (0.0400)
Notch Generations (Treated) 0.162*** 0.0939
(0.0432) (0.0534)
Post Notch -0.344*** -0.163***
(0.0862) (0.0390)
Black -1.211** -0.696**
(0.523) (0.309)
Married 0.575 0.536
(0.429) (0.389)
Separated or Divorced 1.196 0.693
(0.861) (0.617)
Widow 1.091 0.358
(0.654) (0.439)
Never Married 1.089 0.116
(2.088) (1.297)
High School Graduates -0.0673*** -0.0389***
(0.0131) (0.00565)
Cohort 1911 Pre-notch Trend -0.0518*** -0.0372***
(0.0119) (0.00575)
Cohort 1912 Pre-notch Trend -0.0694*** -0.0318***
(0.0127) (0.00508)
Cohort 1913 Pre-notch Trend -0.0590*** -0.0225***
(0.0135) (0.00641)
Cohort 1914 Pre-notch Trend -0.0480*** -0.0227***
(0.0111) (0.00692)
Cohort 1915 Pre-notch Trend -0.0668*** -0.0230***
(0.0139) (0.00651)
Cohort 1916 Pre-notch Trend -0.0672*** -0.0297***
(0.0116) (0.00573)
Cohort 1917 Pre-notch Trend -0.0333*** -0.0216***
(0.00776) (0.00384)
Cohort 1918 Pre-notch Trend -0.0313*** -0.0168***
(0.00577) (0.00443)
Cohort 1919 Pre-notch Trend -0.0338*** -0.00759
(0.00630) (0.00549)
Cohort 1920 Pre-notch Trend -0.0294*** -0.00192
(0.00545) (0.00591)
Cohort 1921 Pre-notch Trend -0.0227** -0.0124**
(0.00922) (0.00428)
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Men Women
Cohort 1910 Post-notch Trend -0.0653*** -0.0318***
(0.0113) (0.00888)
Cohort 1911 Post-notch Trend -0.0451*** -0.0335***
(0.0132) (0.00753)
Cohort 1912 Post-notch Trend -0.0847*** -0.0327***
(0.0125) (0.00725)
Cohort 1913 Post-notch Trend -0.0624*** -0.0235**
(0.0105) (0.00964)
Cohort 1914 Post-notch Trend -0.0701*** -0.0251**
(0.0127) (0.00971)
Cohort 1915 Post-notch Trend -0.0513*** -0.0293***
(0.0106) (0.00761)
Cohort 1916 Post-notch Trend -0.0488*** -0.0194**
(0.0116) (0.00797)
Cohort 1917 Post-notch Trend -0.0691*** -0.0385***
(0.00491) (0.00400)
Cohort 1918 Post-notch Trend -0.0571*** -0.0248***
(0.00701) (0.00607)
Cohort 1919 Post-notch Trend -0.0489*** -0.0178**
(0.00611) (0.00666)
Cohort 1920 Post-notch Trend -0.0327*** -0.00510
(0.00718) (0.00488)
Cohort 1921 Post-notch Trend -0.0202** -0.0102**
(0.00669) (0.00384)
Cohort Fixed Effect Yes Yes
Constant 0.259 0.00801
(0.410) (0.359)
Observations 120 120
R-squared 0.971 0.979
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.3: Effect of Notch Generation on Young Workers’ Employment Rates (Men)
Middle-age Workers Prime Working Age Young Generation
Cohorts 1938-1942 Cohorts 1943-1947 Cohorts 1948-1952
(Age 35-39 in 1977) (Age 30-34 in 1977) (Age 25-29 in 1977)
Notch -0.0172 -0.0585 -0.0136
(0.0126) (0.0297) (0.0652)
Black 0.133 0.169 -1.304
(0.182) (0.403) (0.695)
Married 0.935*** 0.715*** 1.236***
(0.0303) (0.109) (0.253)
Separated or Divorced 0.828** 0.622 2.315**
(0.183) (0.513) (0.545)
Widow 2.141 1.571 5.504
(1.810) (2.332) (5.712)
Never Married 0.932*** 0.960*** 0.662**
(0.106) (0.0881) (0.208)
High School Graduates -0.152 0.523 0.0563
(0.472) (0.372) (0.825)
Cohort 1938 Pre-notch Trend 0.00648
(0.00397)
Cohort 1939 Pre-notch Trend 0.00239
(0.00280)
Cohort 1940 Pre-notch Trend -0.00195
(0.00274)
Cohort 1941 Pre-notch Trend -0.00110
(0.00197)
Cohort 1942 Pre-notch Trend -0.00530**
(0.00135)
Cohort 1938 Post-notch Trend 0.0764***
(0.00944)
Cohort 1939 Post-notch Trend 0.0578***
(0.00756)
Cohort 1940 Post-notch Trend 0.0359***
(0.00529)
Cohort 1941 Post-notch Trend 0.0240***
(0.00432)
Cohort 1942 Post-notch Trend 0.0191**
(0.00416)
Cohort 1943 Pre-notch Trend -0.00994
(0.00618)
Cohort 1944 Pre-notch Trend -0.0114
(0.00653)
Cohort 1945 Pre-notch Trend -0.0123
(0.00608)
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Middle-age Workers Prime Working Age Young Generation
Cohorts 1938-1942 Cohorts 1943-1947 Cohorts 1948-1952
(Age 35-39 in 1977) (Age 30-34 in 1977) (Age 25-29 in 1977)
Cohort 1946 Pre-notch Trend -0.0110
(0.00619)
Cohort 1947 Pre-notch Trend -0.0111
(0.00675)
Cohort 1943 Post-notch Trend 0.0378**
(0.0101)
Cohort 1944 Post-notch Trend 0.0255**
(0.00656)
Cohort 1945 Post-notch Trend 0.0153**
(0.00435)
Cohort 1946 Post-notch Trend 0.00858*
(0.00350)
Cohort 1947 Post-notch Trend 0.00622
(0.00570)
Cohort 1948 Pre-notch Trend 0.00824
(0.0214)
Cohort 1949 Pre-notch Trend 0.00184
(0.0171)
Cohort 1950 Pre-notch Trend -0.00257
(0.0149)
Cohort 1951 Pre-notch Trend -0.00499
(0.00820)
Cohort 1952 Pre-notch Trend 0.00195
(0.00807)
Cohort 1948 Post-notch Trend 0.0719
(0.0419)
Cohort 1949 Post-notch Trend 0.0594
(0.0336)
Cohort 1950 Post-notch Trend 0.0429
(0.0286)
Cohort 1951 Post-notch Trend 0.0325
(0.0205)
Cohort 1952 Post-notch Trend 0.0278
(0.0170)
Age Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Observations 50 50 50
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.4: Effect of Notch Generation on Young Workers’ Employment Rates (Women)
Middle-age Workers Prime Working Age Young Generation
Cohorts 1938-1942 Cohorts 1943-1947 Cohorts 1948-1952
(Age 35-39 in 1977) (Age 30-34 in 1977) (Age 25-29 in 1977)
Notch 0.0930* 0.0875 0.00398
(0.0357) (0.0592) (0.0253)
Black -0.546 -0.0263 -0.333
(0.381) (0.792) (0.586)
Married 0.392** 0.502* -0.102
(0.121) (0.216) (0.246)
Separated or Divorced 0.716 0.471 -0.101
(0.445) (0.318) (0.356)
Widow 1.856 -0.573 4.380**
(1.735) (2.224) (1.073)
Never Married 0.394 0.396 0.615***
(0.502) (0.377) (0.0602)
High School Graduates 0.907 -0.378 0.652**
(0.859) (1.080) (0.213)
Cohort 1938 Pre-notch Trend 0.0218**
(0.00510)
Cohort 1939 Pre-notch Trend 0.0202**
(0.00468)
Cohort 1940 Pre-notch Trend 0.0158**
(0.00394)
Cohort 1941 Pre-notch Trend 0.0131*
(0.00523)
Cohort 1942 Pre-notch Trend 0.0101**
(0.00269)
Cohort 1938 Post-notch Trend 0.0501
(0.0268)
Cohort 1939 Post-notch Trend 0.0478*
(0.0216)
Cohort 1940 Post-notch Trend 0.0354*
(0.0132)
Cohort 1941 Post-notch Trend 0.0268**
(0.00670)
Cohort 1942 Post-notch Trend 0.0201**
(0.00652)
Cohort 1943 Pre-notch Trend 0.0215
(0.0132)
Cohort 1944 Pre-notch Trend 0.0222
(0.0113)
Cohort 1945 Pre-notch Trend 0.0222
(0.0108)
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Middle-age Workers Prime Working Age Young Generation
Cohorts 1938-1942 Cohorts 1943-1947 Cohorts 1948-1952
(Age 35-39 in 1977) (Age 30-34 in 1977) (Age 25-29 in 1977)
Cohort 1946 Pre-notch Trend 0.0173
(0.00982)
Cohort 1947 Pre-notch Trend 0.0209**
(0.00553)
Cohort 1943 Post-notch Trend 0.0721**
(0.0218)
Cohort 1944 Post-notch Trend 0.0635**
(0.0212)
Cohort 1945 Post-notch Trend 0.0483**
(0.0127)
Cohort 1946 Post-notch Trend 0.0436***
(0.00773)
Cohort 1947 Post-notch Trend 0.0373**
(0.00869)
Cohort 1948 Pre-notch Trend 0.00487
(0.00943)
Cohort 1949 Pre-notch Trend 0.00694
(0.00752)
Cohort 1950 Pre-notch Trend 0.00834
(0.00673)
Cohort 1951 Pre-notch Trend 0.00249
(0.00472)
Cohort 1952 Pre-notch Trend 0.000779
(0.00594)
Cohort 1948 Post-notch Trend 0.0202
(0.0254)
Cohort 1949 Post-notch Trend 0.0226
(0.0200)
Cohort 1950 Post-notch Trend 0.0211
(0.0128)
Cohort 1951 Post-notch Trend 0.0153
(0.00992)
Cohort 1952 Post-notch Trend 0.0160*
(0.00651)
Age Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Observations 50 50 50
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.5: Effect of Notch Generation on Young Workers’ Employment Rate by Occupation (Men)
Middle-age Workers Prime Working Age Young Generation
Cohorts 1938-1942 Cohorts 1943-1947 Cohorts 1948-1952
(Age 35-39 in 1977) (Age 30-34 in 1977) (Age 25-29 in 1977)
All -0.0172 -0.0585 -0.0136
(0.0126) (0.0297) (0.0652)
Managerial and Professional -0.0101 -0.00714 -0.0413
(0.00828) (0.00925) (0.0416)
Technical, Sales and Administrative -0.0332 -0.0261 -0.00196
(0.0292) (0.0499) (0.0582)
Service -0.115** -0.104 -0.0761
(0.0386) (0.0498) (0.0362)
Farming, Forestry, and Fishing -0.0526 -0.0996 -0.0482
(0.0720) (0.0727) (0.0786)
Precision Production, Craft, and Repair 0.0122 -0.0456 -0.0566
(0.0236) (0.0866) (0.0676)
Operators, Fabricators, and Laborers -0.0236 -0.0897** -0.0609
(0.0458) (0.0207) (0.0898)
Robust standard errors are in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.6: Effect of Notch Generation on Young Workers’ Employment Rate by Occupation (Women)
Middle-age Workers Prime Working Age Young Generation
Cohorts 1938-1942 Cohorts 1943-1947 Cohorts 1948-1952
(Age 35-39 in 1977) (Age 30-34 in 1977) (Age 25-29 in 1977)
All 0.0930* 0.0875 0.00398
(0.0357) (0.0592) (0.0253)
Managerial and Professional -0.0472 -0.216*** -0.0605*
(0.122) (0.0353) (0.0282)
Technical, Sales and Administrative -0.0410 -0.168 -0.0852
(0.0463) (0.0816) (0.0725)
Service -0.0281 -0.234 -0.148
(0.0588) (0.118) (0.112)
Farming, Forestry, and Fishing -1.137 -0.964 -0.825**
(0.543) (0.516) (0.247)
Precision Production, Craft, and Repair -0.164 -0.256 -0.168
(0.0857) (0.144) (0.221)
Operators, Fabricators, and Laborers 0.132 -0.139 -0.161
(0.0695) (0.110) (0.190)
Robust standard errors are in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.7: Effect of Notch Generation on Young Workers’ Wage Rates (Men)
Middle-age Workers Prime Working Age Young Generation
Cohorts 1938-1942 Cohorts 1943-1947 Cohorts 1948-1952
(Age 35-39 in 1977) (Age 30-34 in 1977) (Age 25-29 in 1977)
Notch 0.0257 -0.00907 0.121
(0.0838) (0.129) (0.160)
Black -0.483 -0.133 -2.029
(0.659) (1.212) (1.323)
Married 10.57*** 10.09*** 10.88***
(0.0697) (0.377) (0.575)
Separated or Divorced 10.38*** 9.769*** 10.50***
(0.533) (1.069) (0.931)
Widow 11.50** 21.09** 21.20
(2.955) (6.043) (10.64)
Never Married 9.760*** 9.871*** 8.788***
(0.378) (0.291) (0.402)
High School Degree 0.351 1.059 0.630
(0.728) (1.115) (1.805)
Age Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Pre-notch Trend Yes Yes Yes
Post-notch Trend Yes Yes Yes
Observations 50 50 50
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.8: Effect of Notch Generation on Young Workers’ Wage Rates (Women)
Middle-age Workers Prime Working Age Young Generation
Cohorts 1938-1942 Cohorts 1943-1947 Cohorts 1948-1952
(Age 35-39 in 1977) (Age 30-34 in 1977) (Age 25-29 in 1977)
Notch 0.0391 0.0490 -0.0341
(0.0276) (0.0679) (0.0590)
Black -0.0258 0.570 -0.275
(0.444) (1.260) (0.642)
Married 8.403*** 9.158*** 7.777***
(0.115) (0.719) (0.882)
Separated or Divorced 10.06*** 8.674*** 9.071***
(0.410) (0.576) (1.756)
Widow 12.23** 9.306** 14.19*
(2.676) (2.177) (5.733)
Never Married 12.23*** 9.172*** 8.522***
(0.767) (1.773) (0.192)
High School Degree 2.397 -0.0603 0.948
(2.506) (3.386) (1.442)
Age Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Pre-notch Trend Yes Yes Yes
Post-notch Trend Yes Yes Yes
Observations 50 50 50
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.9: Effect of Notch Generation on Young Workers’ Wage Rates by Occupations (Men)
Middle-age Workers Prime Working Age Young Generation
Cohorts 1938-1942 Cohorts 1943-1947 Cohorts 1948-1952
(Age 35-39 in 1977) (Age 30-34 in 1977) (Age 25-29 in 1977)
All 0.0257 -0.00907 0.121
(0.0838) (0.129) (0.160)
Managerial and Professional 0.0638 0.0377 0.0185
(0.0576) (0.0778) (0.135)
Technical, Sales and Administrative -0.00350 0.164 -0.122
(0.142) (0.0839) (0.112)
Service 0.0903 -0.332** -0.0134
(0.152) (0.110) (0.240)
Farming, Forestry, and Fishing -0.114 0.128 0.656
(0.561) (0.389) (0.349)
Precision Production, Craft, and Repair 0.196 -0.114 0.0349
(0.146) (0.105) (0.131)
Operators, Fabricators, and Laborers -0.0433 -0.299** 0.0943
(0.0357) (0.0751) (0.0872)
Robust standard errors are in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.10: Effect of Notch Generation on Young Workers’ Wage Rates by Occupations (Women)
Middle-age Workers Prime Working Age Young Generation
Cohorts 1938-1942 Cohorts 1943-1947 Cohorts 1948-1952
(Age 35-39 in 1977) (Age 30-34 in 1977) (Age 25-29 in 1977)
All 0.0391 0.0490 -0.0341
(0.0276) (0.0679) (0.0590)
Managerial and Professional -0.00316 -0.113 -0.0712
(0.162) (0.183) (0.142)
Technical, Sales and Administrative -0.00312 -0.0178 -0.101
(0.158) (0.113) (0.0735)
Service -0.0855 0.0599 -0.427
(0.321) (0.428) (0.283)
Farming, Forestry, and Fishing -2.395 -1.381 0.244
(7.132) (6.116) (2.689)
Precision Production, Craft, and Repair 2.081 -0.853*** 0.251
(1.008) (0.123) (0.149)
Operators, Fabricators, and Laborers -0.289 -0.0359 0.0540
(0.173) (0.206) (0.118)
Robust standard errors are in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.11: Robustness Tests
Men Women
1970 as Placebo DD Without 1970 as Placebo DD Without
Notch Year Cohort 1916 Notch Year Cohort 1916
Difference-in-Difference 0.00613 0.305*** 0.00509 0.143***
(0.00835) (0.0939) (0.0224) (0.0397)
Notch Cohorts (Treated) 0.0203** 0.144** 0.00633 0.109**
(0.00737) (0.0470) (0.0313) (0.0480)
Post Notch -0.0149 -0.388*** 0.0144 -0.189***
(0.00972) (0.0861) (0.0215) (0.0392)
Black -0.631*** -0.882 -0.472 -0.586*
(0.143) (0.556) (0.378) (0.300)
Married 0.00791 0.383 0.437*** 0.313
(0.173) (0.331) (0.0489) (0.398)
Separated or Divorced 0.173 0.757 1.111*** 0.401
(0.209) (0.646) (0.284) (0.597)
Widow -0.235 0.922 0.595** 0.238
(0.463) (0.572) (0.218) (0.477)
High School Degree 0.773* 0.274 -0.0728 -0.116
(0.416) (2.115) (0.509) (1.343)
Cohort 1910 Pre-notch Trend -0.00927*** -0.0734*** 0.567** -0.0427***
(0.00146) (0.0135) (0.221) (0.00552)
Cohort 1911 Pre-notch Trend -0.0151*** -0.0578*** -0.000225 -0.0415***
(0.00187) (0.0115) (0.00281) (0.00545)
Cohort 1912 Pre-notch Trend -0.00185 -0.0748*** -0.00228 -0.0341***
(0.00201) (0.0121) (0.00394) (0.00519)
Cohort 1913 Pre-notch Trend -0.00431 -0.0661*** 0.00662* -0.0267***
(0.00287) (0.0138) (0.00315) (0.00657)
Cohort 1914 Pre-notch Trend -0.00215 -0.0535*** -0.00665* -0.0270***
(0.00159) (0.0106) (0.00309) (0.00679)
Cohort 1915 Pre-notch Trend -4.29e-05 -0.0711*** 0.00666* -0.0275***
(0.00137) (0.0135) (0.00333) (0.00633)
Cohort 1916 Pre-notch Trend 0.00159 -0.00615
(0.00239) (0.00362)
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Men Women
1970 as Placebo DD Without 1970 as Placebo DD Without
Notch Year Cohort 1916 Notch Year Cohort 1916
Cohort 1917 Pre-notch Trend 0.00229** -0.0297*** -0.000683 -0.0224***
(0.000872) (0.00741) (0.00418) (0.00365)
Cohort 1918 Pre-notch Trend -0.00452** -0.0301*** 0.00852*** -0.0177***
(0.00153) (0.00504) (0.00225) (0.00415)
Cohort 1919 Pre-notch Trend -0.00574*** -0.0332*** 0.00388* -0.00960*
(0.00111) (0.00603) (0.00207) (0.00528)
Cohort 1920 Pre-notch Trend -0.00245** -0.0298*** 0.00852*** -0.00393
(0.000858) (0.00518) (0.00207) (0.00537)
Cohort 1921 Pre-notch Trend -0.000970 -0.0195** 0.0217*** -0.0129**
(0.000703) (0.00863) (0.00222) (0.00454)
Cohort 1910 Post-notch Trend -0.0590*** -0.0571*** 0.00986*** -0.0315***
(0.00117) (0.0103) (0.00237) (0.00923)
Cohort 1911 Post-notch Trend -0.0517*** -0.0402** -0.0266*** -0.0332***
(0.00246) (0.0134) (0.00269) (0.00761)
Cohort 1912 Post-notch Trend -0.0227*** -0.0767*** -0.0345*** -0.0318***
(0.00278) (0.0136) (0.00152) (0.00756)
Cohort 1913 Post-notch Trend -0.0246*** -0.0584*** -0.0141*** -0.0247**
(0.00282) (0.0104) (0.00379) (0.00906)
Cohort 1914 Post-notch Trend -0.0146*** -0.0605*** -0.0305*** -0.0253**
(0.00128) (0.0138) (0.00166) (0.00922)
Cohort 1915 Post-notch Trend -0.0168*** -0.0461*** -0.00566 -0.0288***
(0.00184) (0.0104) (0.00328) (0.00722)
Cohort 1916 Post-notch Trend -0.0150*** -0.0174***
(0.000701) (0.00257)
Cohort 1917 Post-notch Trend -0.0124*** -0.0691*** -0.0262*** -0.0402***
(0.000998) (0.00440) (0.00419) (0.00339)
Cohort 1918 Post-notch Trend -0.0181*** -0.0580*** -0.0122*** -0.0271***
(0.000441) (0.00651) (0.000936) (0.00507)
Cohort 1919 Post-notch Trend -0.0156*** -0.0493*** -0.0233*** -0.0202***
(0.000724) (0.00555) (0.00273) (0.00625)
Cohort 1920 Post-notch Trend -0.0149*** -0.0352*** -0.0332*** -0.00664
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Men Women
1970 as Placebo DD Without 1970 as Placebo DD Without
Notch Year Cohort 1916 Notch Year Cohort 1916
(0.00138) (0.00661) (0.00325) (0.00427)
Cohort 1921 Post-notch Trend -0.0111*** -0.0194*** -0.0124*** -0.0105**
(0.00112) (0.00610) (0.00134) (0.00375)
Constant 0.959*** 0.452 0.567** 0.197
(0.172) (0.312) (0.221) (0.375)
Cohort Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 120 110 120 110
R-squared 0.977 0.976 0.999 0.982
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.12: Occupational Categories
Managerial and Professional Service
Executive, Administrative, and Managerial Occupations Private Household Occupations
Management Related Occupations Supervisors, Protective Service
Engineers, Architects, and Surveyors Firefighting and Fire Prevention
Mathematical and Computer Scientists Police and Detectives
Natural Scientists Guards
Health Diagnosing Occupations Food Preparation and Service
Therapists Health Service
Teachers Cleaning and Building Service
Librarians, Archivists, and Curators Personal Service
Social Scientists and Urban Planners Precision Production, Craft, and Repair
Social, Recreation, and Religious Workers Vehicle and Mobile Equipment Mechanics and Repairers
Lawyers and Judges Electrical and Electronic Equipment Repairers
Writers, Artists, Entertainers, and Athletes Miscellaneous Mechanics and Repairers
Technical, Sales and Administrative Construction Trades
Health Technologists and Technicians Extractive (Oil and Mining)
Engineering and Related Technologists and Technicians Precision Metal Working
Science Technicians Precision Woodworking
Technicians, Except Health, Engineering, and Science Precision Textile, Apparel, and Furnishings Machine Workers
Sales Representatives, Finance and Business Services Precision Workers, Assorted Materials
Commodities Except Retail Precision Food Production
Retail and Personal Services Precision Inspectors, Testers, and Related Workers
Sales Related Occupations Plant and System Operators
Supervisors, Administrative Support Occupations Operators, Fabricators, and Laborers
Computer Equipment Operators Metalworking and Plastic Working Machine Operators
Secretaries, Stenographers, and Typists Metal and Plastic Processing Machine Operators
Information Clerks Woodworking Machine Operators
Records Processing Occupations, Except Financial Printing Machine Operators
Financial Records Processing Occupations Textile, Apparel, and Furnishings Machine Operators
Duplicating, Mail, and Other Office Machine Operators Machine Operators, Assorted Materials
Communications Equipment Operators Fabricators, Assemblers, and Hand Working
Mail and Message Distributing Production Inspectors, Testers, Samplers, and Weighers
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Material Recording, Scheduling, and Distributing Clerks Motor Vehicle Operators
Adjusters and Investigators Rail and Water Transportation
Miscellaneous Administrative Support Material Moving Equipment Operators
Farming, Forestry, and Fishing Helpers, Construction and Extractive Occupations
Farm Operators and Managers Freight, Stock, and Material Handlers
Related Agricultural
Forestry and Logging
Fishers, Hunters, and Trappers
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Chapter 4
Conclusion
This dissertation discusses the causes and consequences of greater labor supply at older ages
due to increasing life expectancy. It answers the following research questions: how does
longer life expectancy correlate with stronger labor market attachment at older age? Is
there empirical and theoretical evidence? What is the consequence of a greater labor force
participation of older workers on younger workers’ labor market prospects?
The first essay examines the effect of longevity on older Americans’ labor supply decisions
of retirement and un-retirement. I find as high as 25% of labor market re-entries among male
retirees in the US. Un-retirement is becoming very common but often ignored in empirical
studies. With improving health and increasing life expectancy at older ages, retirement is no
longer an absorbing state. The contribution of the first essay is not only providing empirical
evidence that greater longevity is one of the major explanations of later retirement, but
also one of the first studies that explain the trend of labor market re-entries with increasing
life expectancy. More importantly, I find that individuals retire and un-retire rationally as
if they know their true longevity. This finding does not contradict with the fact that the
subjective survival probability in HRS is biased due to the complex probability questions
in the survey. Studies that directly utilize the subjective survival rates should be careful to
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such biasedness.
The second essay provides further evidence from a simulation exercise. Under lower risk of
mortality, rational utility-maximizing individuals who value good health work more and are
willing to spend more on health. The contribution of the second essay is the endogenization
of individuals’ survival probability, which is linked to a health production process. I find that
with life expectancy projected to increase by 9 years in 2100, on average the labor supply from
age 30-55 are significantly higher than the levels in 2000. Since higher survival probability
directly affects the value of utility from future health and consumption, individuals living in
a more favorable environment show more forward-looking behaviors.
The consequences of a greater labor supply of older workers have both potential positive
and negative impacts on the economy. One of the negative impacts could be the crowding-
out of young workers’ employment opportunities and suppression of the youth’s wage rate.
The third essay provides estimation of the short-run relationship between older and younger
workers during Social Security notch, which substantially decreases Social Security benefits
for cohort 1917-1921 compared to cohort 1910-1916. Using a Difference-in-Difference model
and a fixed-effect model, I find no evidence supporting the crowding-out effect on employment
rates due to the notch (year 1977) nor any suppressing effect on all young workers’ (birth
cohort 1938-1952) wage rates at subsequent years. My findings are consistent with the
long-run relationship estimated by Munnell and Wu (2012).
Greater labor supply of older workers in the near future is inevitable. In fact, it could
be beneficial to the economy. For example, it may contribute to national output, increased
tax revenues and help solve solvency crisis of public pension. I believe with efficient public
pension policies and improving the health care system, the U.S. population will be aging
gracefully.
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